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Numerous federal statutes rely on a distinction between employees and independent 
contractors. Based on a series of Supreme Court decisions from 1968 through 2003, 
courts and administrative agencies have used a common law multifactor test to draw this 
distinction. In an effort to enhance predictability and certainty within and across 
legislation, these cases have rejected a purposive approach in applying the test. But the 
Supreme Court has never said which, if any, of the factors are the most important in the 
analysis, nor has anyone determined whether the underlying purpose—enhancing 
predictability and certainty—has been attained. 
This empirical study uses content analysis to answer these questions. First, based 
on a variety of statistics, it determines which factors are the most and least important 
under several federal statutory schemes. Next, it calculates the factors’ accuracies and 
compares the results to determine if there is consistency within and across the legislation 
and whether predictability and certainty have been achieved. Concluding that 
predictability and certainty have not been achieved using the common law multifactor 
test, this Article proposes and evaluates reform efforts to solve, or at least reduce, the 
inconsistency problem while still achieving the goals of the legislation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The term “employee” is prevalent among federal statutes. Employees, covered 
under these acts, are distinguished from independent contractors, who are not covered. 
For example, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides employees the rights 
to organize, join unions, and bargain collectively, but those same rights are not provided 
to independent contractors.1 Antidiscrimination statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, and age with respect to employees, but do 
not protect independent contractors.2 The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 
requires employers to provide a place of employment “free from recognized hazards that 
are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to . . . employees,”3 but 
the act does not extend to those hiring independent contractors.4 The Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) protects employees’ and former employees’ 
benefit plans by setting standards of conduct and mechanisms to protect plan funds,5 
 
 1. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), Pub. L. No. 80-101, §§ 2(3), 7, 61 Stat. 136, 
137–38, 140 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 157 (2018)); Ruth Burdick, Principles of 
Agency Permit the NLRB to Consider Additional Factors of Entrepreneurial Independence and the Relative 
Dependence of Employees When Determining Independent Contractor Status Under Section 2(3), 15 HOFSTRA 
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 75, 76–77 (1997). 
 2. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2)–(3) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2018) (Title VII);   
id. §§ 12112(a)–(b)(1), 12112(b)(5)(A) (ADA); Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond “Economic 
Realities”: The Case for Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent 
Contractors, 38 B.C. L. REV. 239, 239–40 (1997). 
 3. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). 
 4. See Vergona Crane Co., 15 BNA OSHC 1782, 1992 WL 184539 (No. 88–1745, 1992) (affirming an 
OSHA violation in part because the worker was an employee, not an independent contractor). 
 5. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). 
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while preempting state law claims,6 but only applies to employees, not independent 
contractors.7 And the Copyright Act grants initial copyright ownership to entities hiring 
employees but not those hiring independent contractors.8 
Despite the key role of the term “employee” in these federal statutes, Congress has 
either not defined the term9 or has given circular definitions that fail to clarify its 
meaning.10 As a result, courts have been tasked with gap filling to provide meaning to 
the term “employee” in the various statutory schemes.11 Over the years, courts have come 
up with multiple approaches to determine whether someone worked as an employee.12 
After a series of Supreme Court cases from the mid-twentieth century through the 
early 2000s, courts have coalesced around a common law multifactor test.13 But this test, 
consisting of roughly a dozen factors, gives no indication of which factors, if any, are the 
most important in the analysis.14 With so many factors and no guidance as to their relative 
importance, it is no surprise that confusion and inconsistency abound. Confusion and 
inconsistency undermine predictability and certainty, which makes planning difficult for 
affected individuals and businesses15 and results in a tremendous amount of litigation 
over whether hired individuals are employees or independent contractors.16 
Moreover, given the variety of acts relying on employee status, a potential exists 
for inconsistent application and results of the test depending on which act applies. That 
is, an individual doing the same job could be an employee for copyright purposes but an 
 
 6. JAYNE E. ZANGLEIN ET AL., ERISA LITIGATION 5 (5th ed. 2014) (“If an ERISA plan is involved, 
ERISA governs and preempts most state law claims.”). 
 7. See id. at 34–35. 
 8. Ryan Vacca, Work Made for Hire—Analyzing the Multifactor Balancing Test, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
197, 198–99 (2014). 
 9. E.g., id. at 209 (describing the Copyright Act’s lack of a definition of “employee”). 
 10. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (“ERISA’s nominal definition of 
‘employee’ as ‘any individual employed by an employer’ is completely circular and explains nothing.” (citation 
omitted)); Frank J. Menetrez, Employee Status and the Concept of Control in Federal Employment 
Discrimination Law, 63 SMU L. REV. 137, 144 (2010) (describing circular definitions in Title VII, the ADA, 
and the ADEA). 
 11. See Patricia Davidson, Comment, The Definition of “Employee” Under Title VII: Distinguishing 
Between Employees and Independent Contractors, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 203, 206–07 (1984). 
 12. See infra Section I for an overview of these approaches. 
 13. See infra Section I for an explanation of how courts, Congress, the American Law Institute, and 
commentators interchangeably refer to this test in its current and historical forms as the “right to control test,” 
“common law multifactor test,” “multifactor test,” “common law multifactor right to control test,” “common 
law agency test,” and other combinations of the terms “right to control,” “multifactor,” and “common law.” 
 14. Darden, 503 U.S. at 324; Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989) 
(“No one of these factors is determinative.”); NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968) (“[A]ll 
of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive.”); Vacca, 
supra note 8, at 199. 
 15. See Matthew T. Bodie, Participating as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 661,    
682–83 (2013) (“Courts and commentators continue to bemoan its inability to deliver clear answers.”); Richard 
R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought To Stop Trying, 22 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 298–99, 326 (2001) (“[T]he resulting multi-factored analysis becomes more 
complex and its outcomes less predictable.”); see also Blake E. Stafford, Comment, Riding the Line Between 
“Employee” and “Independent Contractor” in the Modern Sharing Economy, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1223, 
1242 (2016) (“[T]he factors provide little clarity to business owners.”). 
 16. See Stafford, supra note 15, at 1242. 
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independent contractor for purposes of Title VII, even though courts are applying the 
same test to identical facts. Such outcomes may impose unnecessary costs by furthering 
confusion and inconsistency. Then again, perhaps these costs are worthwhile given the 
different purposes of the acts. 
This empirical study answers the questions of which factors in the common law 
multifactor test are the most and least important in several areas of federal law. In doing 
so, it examines whether the results are consistent with the stated purpose or purposes of 
adopting the test and compares the results under the different acts to determine if there 
is consistency across legislation using the same term and approach to defining 
“employee.” 
As described below, the results show that there is little consistency and 
predictability from using the common law multifactor test, and, although there is some 
consistency across legislation, the importance of the factors varies widely depending on 
which act applies. Sometimes these differences make sense given the purposes of the 
legislation, but sometimes they are inconsistent with the purposes or have no readily 
apparent justification. 
Section I of this Article describes the development of the common law multifactor 
test for distinguishing employees from independent contractors as well as how and why 
the Supreme Court (or controlling agency) adopted this test for the NLRA, Copyright 
Act, ERISA, OSHA, Title VII, ADA, and ADEA. Section II explains the methodology 
of this study, including a description of content analysis and the specific data collected. 
Section III describes the results, including the different measures of importance and 
continua that group together factors sharing similar features with respect to the measures 
of importance. It then situates the results with the rationales for adopting the common 
law multifactor test in each area and highlights notable matters in the results. Section IV 
compares the continua across legislation to explore the similarities and differences and 
whether they are justified. This Section then proposes alternative approaches to achieve 
the goals of the examined legislation, while at the same time solving the problem of 
inconsistency within and across legislation. 
I. COALESCENCE TOWARD THE COMMON LAW MULTIFACTOR TEST 
To understand if the test to determine employee status is consistently applied within 
and across statutory schemes and also furthers the purpose of adopting such a test, it is 
necessary to understand what the test is and how it developed. This Section traces the 
history of the common law multifactor test from its history in eighteenth-century England 
through the early 2000s. For each body of legislation analyzed, this Section describes 
how and why the Supreme Court (or other controlling tribunal) adopted this test. It also 
illustrates how the Supreme Court has not only adopted a seemingly uniform test across 
these varied areas of the law but has done so with a common emphasis on predictability 
and certainty as well as a disdain for purposivism.17 
 
 17. Purposivism refers to the idea of interpreting statutes to carry out their legislative purpose. John F. 
Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 119. Purposivism is derived from the notion that 
“[l]egislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, 
to formulate a plan of government.” Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. 
L. REV. 527, 538–39 (1947). 
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A. Early History 
The distinction between employees and independent contractors originated from 
tort liability for the acts of third parties.18 Prior to the introduction of respondeat superior, 
a master was responsible only for acts the master commanded the servant to perform.19 
Around the beginning of the eighteenth century, English courts began imposing liability 
on masters for their servants’ acts regardless of whether the master had given explicit 
authority to perform the tort-causing act.20 By 1765, Blackstone commented that a 
master’s liability for the acts of its servant was an established common law principle.21 
But during the early- to mid-nineteenth century, with an increase in industrial 
activity, there was an enormous growth in the number of individuals hired for a particular 
skill with the expectation that the hiring party would not be responsible for their conduct 
because they could not effectively control the individual’s performance nor effectively 
insure against any potential negligence.22 Courts struggled to draw the line between those 
who should be responsible for the harms to third parties and those who should escape 
liability.23 
By the mid-nineteenth century, English and American courts circumscribed 
vicarious liability and respondeat superior by distinguishing between employees and 
independent contractors on the basis of the right to control.24 The rationale for this 
limitation on vicarious liability and respondeat superior was that it protected hiring 
parties who purchased someone’s services but had no realistic means to supervise the 
work, while also permitting a declaration of fault on the employer for controlling the 
injury-causing activity, failing to object to the work, failing to adequately supervise the 
work, or carelessly selecting the employee.25 
And until the early- to mid-twentieth century, courts classified workers for 
respondeat superior purposes using the right to control; the more control a hiring party 
exercised over a hired party’s performance, the more likely the court would find the hired 
party to be an employee.26 If the hired party was an employee, then the hiring party would 
be liable for the employee’s negligence.27 But if the hired party was an independent 
contractor, then the hiring party could avoid liability.28 
 
 18. Lisa J. Bernt, Suppressing the Mischief: New Work, Old Problems, 6 NE. U. L.J. 311, 314 (2014). 
 19. Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 75, 96 (1984). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 97. 
 22. See id. at 98–100; see also Carlson, supra note 15, at 304. 
 23. Carlson, supra note 15, at 304. 
 24. Dowd, supra note 19, at 99–100; see also John Bruntz, The Employee/Independent Contractor 
Dichotomy: A Rose Is Not Always a Rose, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 337, 339 (1991). 
 25. See Carlson, supra note 15, at 304; see also Robert L. Redfearn III, Comment, Sharing Economy 
Misclassification: Employees and Independent Contractors in Transportation Network Companies, 31 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023, 1030 (2016). 
 26. Redfearn, supra note 25, at 1030. 
 27. Bernt, supra note 18, at 314. 
 28. Id. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3359683
126 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92 
In 1933, the American Law Institute published the Restatement of Agency, which 
aimed to analyze and explain the common law of agency.29 Section 220 defined the term 
“servant” for purposes of tort liability to third parties.30 This provision defined a servant 
as “a person employed to perform service for another in his affairs and who, with respect 
to his physical conduct in the performance of the service, is subject to the other’s control 
or right to control.”31 The Restatement’s adoption of the “right to control” test accurately 
reflected the common law practices. To distinguish between servants and independent 
contractors, the Restatement set forth a multifactor test listing the following factors to be 
considered: 
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the 
details of the work; 
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or 
business; 
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is 
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without 
supervision; 
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and 
the place of work for the person doing the work; 
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed; 
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; and 
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of master 
and servant.32  
In the comments, the Restatement explained that “[t]he relationship of master and 
servant is one not capable of exact definition,” that “[i]t cannot . . . be defined in general 
terms with substantial accuracy,” and that the factors listed above “are all considered in 
determining the question.”33 The common law multifactor test, as the Restatement 
described, was a flexible and ad hoc approach.34 
Interestingly, and important for this Article, the Restatement also addressed the 
issue of interpreting the term in a statutory context.35 The Restatement noted that 
“[s]tatutes have been passed in which the words ‘servant’ and ‘agent’ have been used. 
The meaning of these words in statutes varies. The context and purpose of the particular 
statute controls the meaning which is frequently not that which the same word bears in 
the Restatement of this [s]ubject.”36 Thus, the guidance was that the context and purpose 
of the statute was to be given weight when interpreting the term servant (now employee) 
 
 29. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY (AM. LAW INST. 1933); Burdick, supra note 1, at 87. 
 30. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 220. 
 31. Id. § 220(1). 
 32. Id. § 220(2). 
 33. Id. § 220 cmt. b. 
 34. Burdick, supra note 1, at 89. 
 35. Id. at 90. 
 36. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. d. 
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in a statute and to realize that the common law multifactor test may not be appropriate 
for particular statutory schemes.37 
Although this test was almost exclusively used for imposing negligence liability on 
employers,38 and considering the words of warning in the Restatement about interpreting 
the term in statutes, courts began using this common law test during the New Deal era in 
the areas of collective bargaining and worker protection.39 
B. National Labor Relation Act (NLRA) 
The first major development towards the establishment of the common law 
multifactor test in federal law occurred in the NLRA. After more than two decades of 
back-and-forth between Congress and the Supreme Court, the common law multifactor 
test became the test for distinguishing between employees and independent contractors.40 
It also serves as the basis for rejecting a purposive approach in interpreting the term 
“employee.”41 
The NLRA, enacted in 1935 as part of the Wagner Act, established a national policy 
in favor of collective bargaining.42 It granted employees “the right to self-organization, 
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives 
of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”43 It further banned employers from 
engaging in certain unfair labor practices, including interfering with, restraining, or 
coercing employees in exercising their collective bargaining rights; dominating or 
assisting labor organizations; discriminating based on union membership or participation 
in NLRA proceedings; and refusing to bargain in good faith with unions representing 
employees.44 It also created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to enforce the 
NLRA.45 
Important for purposes of this Article is that the substantive rights granted under 
the Wagner Act pertained to employees.46 The Wagner Act, in turn, defined employees 
as 
any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular 
employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any 
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, 
 
 37. See Burdick, supra note 1, at 90. 
 38. Carlson, supra note 15, at 305; Redfearn, supra note 25, at 1028. 
 39. Redfearn, supra note 25, at 1029–30. 
 40. See infra text accompanying notes 55–100. 
 41. See infra text accompanying notes 101–02. 
 42. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1532–33 
(2002); see National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 7, 49 Stat. 449, 452 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018)). 
 43. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act) § 7. 
 44. Estlund, supra note 42, at 1533 (citing National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act) § 8). 
 45. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act) §§ 3, 10. 
 46. See, e.g., id. §§ 7–8 (“Employees shall have the right . . . . It shall be an unfair labor practice for an 
employer—(1) [t]o interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees . . . (4) [t]o discharge or otherwise discriminate 
against an employee . . . (5) [t]o refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
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any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has 
not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but 
shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the 
domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual 
employed by his parent or spouse.47 
But other than excluding agricultural laborers, domestic servants, and some family 
relationships, the statutory definition of employee did not tell us much. The Wagner Act 
had no explicit exclusion for independent contractors.48 
Because of the common law distinction between independent contractors and 
employees, the NLRB exempted independent contractors from the NLRA.49 From 1935 
until 1944, the NLRB distinguished between employees and independent contractors 
using the common law factors but also considered the purposes of the NLRA, as 
recommended in the Restatement, to have an expansive understanding of the term 
beyond what the common law provided.50 
But in 1943, in Hearst Publications v. NLRB,51 the Ninth Circuit rejected the 
NLRB’s approach and held that the term “employee” in the NLRA was to be determined 
using the common law right to control test.52 The Ninth Circuit cited to courts 
interpreting other federal statutes using the term “employee,” such as the Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act, Social Security Act, and Federal Safety Appliance Act, and 
noted that these courts interpreted employee using the common law right to control test.53 
It rejected the purposive approach that the NLRB advocated for.54 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the term “employee” 
under the NLRA was not limited to how that term was interpreted under the common 
law test.55 The respondents argued that because Congress did not explicitly define the 
term, it must be determined using the common law test for distinguishing employees 
from independent contractors.56 The Court first rejected this argument by noting that 
although it “assumes there is some simple, uniform and easily applicable test which the 
courts have used . . . to determine whether persons doing work for others fall in one class 
or the other, [u]nfortunately this is not true.”57 The Court then explained how the right 
to control was used for determining tort liability under respondeat superior, but that the 
test is not controlling to determine the meaning in other contexts.58 The Court also noted 
that the simplicity of the test was illusory and that “[f]ew problems in the law have given 
greater variety of application and conflict in results than the cases arising in the 
borderland between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship and what is 
 
 47. Id. § 2(3). 
 48. Burdick, supra note 1, at 76–77. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. 136 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1943), rev’d, NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
 52. Hearst, 136 F.2d at 612–13. 
 53. Id. at 612. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 134–35. 
 56. Id. at 120. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 120–21. 
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clearly one of independent, entrepreneurial dealing.”59 According to the Court, this 
illusion of simplicity was true with respect to tort liability and is more varied and 
problematic when applied to other areas of the law.60 
Instead of using the common law right to control test, the Court held that a broader 
interpretation should be used, wherein economic factors should play an important role.61 
The Court justified this approach by explaining that the policies underlying the common 
law test differed from the policies underlying the Wagner Act.62 In analyzing whether 
the hired parties in the case were employees or independent contractors, the Court 
explained that it “must be answered primarily from the history, terms, and purposes of 
the legislation” and that the term “‘takes color from its surroundings . . . [in] the statute 
where it appears’ and derives meaning from the context of [the] statute, which ‘must be 
read in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.’”63 
As applied to the workers in question, the Court determined that the purposes of the 
Wagner Act allowed the NLRB to consider the economic facts of the employment.64 The 
Court explained that the purpose of the Wagner Act was “to encourage collective 
bargaining and to remedy the individual worker’s inequality of bargaining power.”65 The 
Court noted that “[i]nequality of bargaining power in controversies over wages, hours 
and working conditions may as well characterize the status of [independent contractors] 
as of [employees]” and that independent contractors, “when acting alone, may be as 
‘helpless in dealing with an employer,’ as ‘dependent . . . on his daily wage’ and as 
‘unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment’ as [an 
employee].”66 As such, the Court concluded that unions may be essential to help both 
groups deal with their employer67 and that the Wagner Act should be interpreted broadly 
to cover more than employees as defined under the common law test.68 As of 1944, 
Hearst established that statutory purpose was of primary importance in determining 
employee status and that in some contexts, the meaning of employee could vary from the 
common law standard.69 
Shortly after Hearst, the Supreme Court decided two additional cases interpreting 
the term “employee” in the context of the Social Security Act (SSA) and the Fair Labor 
 
 59. Id. at 121. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 128–29; see also Bruntz, supra note 24, at 349–50; Redfearn, supra note 25, at 1032. 
 62. See Hearst, 322 U.S. at 125–29; Bruntz, supra note 24, at 350. 
 63. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 124 (omission in original) (first alteration in original) (first quoting United States 
v. American Trucking Ass’n, 310 U.S. 534, 545 (1940); then quoting S. Chi. Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 
U.S. 251, 259 (1940)). 
 64. Burdick, supra note 1, at 106. 
 65. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 126 (citing National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), Pub. L. No.      
74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 450). 
 66. Id. at 127 (omission in original) (quoting Am. Steel Foundries Co. v. Tri-City Council, 257 U.S. 184, 
209 (1921)). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 128–29; Burdick, supra note 1, at 107. 
 69. Carlson, supra note 15, at 319 (explaining why the legislative history supports a broad and purposive 
reading of the Wagner Act); see Burdick, supra note 1, at 90–92. 
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Standards Act (FLSA).70 In United States. v. Silk,71 the Court determined whether 
individuals who unloaded coal for a coal yard and truckers who made deliveries for their 
alleged employer were employees under the SSA.72 The Court observed that the SSA 
lacked a helpful definition of employee, just like the Wagner Act, and like with the 
Wagner Act, the Court should construe the term in light of the purpose of the statute.73 
That same day, the Court also handed down Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,74 
which dealt with the FLSA.75 Similar to Silk, the Court noted the lack of a helpful 
definition in the FLSA.76 After describing the purposes of the FLSA as trying to reduce 
“subnormal labor conditions,” the Court held that “boners” working at a meat processing 
plant were employees covered under the FLSA’s expansive definition of employee.77 By 
1947, the purposive approach to distinguishing employees from independent contractors 
had taken hold. 
But three years later, Congress rejected the Supreme Court’s decision in Hearst, 
including its purposive approach, when it enacted the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.78 The 
Taft-Hartley Act amended the NLRA to explicitly exclude independent contractors from 
the definition of employee.79 The NLRA now defines employee as it did under the 
Wagner Act, but adds, in relevant part, that an employee “shall not include . . . any 
individual having the status of an independent contractor.”80 
The change to the statutory definition, standing alone, did not necessarily reject the 
Court’s decision in Hearst as Congress did not provide an alternative test in the statute 
itself to distinguish employees from independent contractors.81 However, the legislative 
history provided a strong expression of Congressional intent.82 
The House Report extensively attacked the NLRB’s and Supreme Court’s opinions 
in Hearst.83 The report introduced the change to the definition of employee by noting: 
An “employee,” according to all standard dictionaries, according to the law as 
the courts have stated it, and according to the understanding of almost 
everyone, with the exception of members of the National Labor Relations 
Board, means someone who works for another for hire. But in the case of 
National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc. (322 U.S. 111 
(1944)), the Board expanded the definition of the term “employee” beyond 
 
 70. Carlson, supra note 15, at 319–20; see also Redfearn, supra note 25, at 1032. 
 71. 331 U.S. 704 (1947). 
 72. Carlson, supra note 15, at 319. 
 73. Silk, 331 U.S. at 711–12. 
 74. 331 U.S. 722 (1947). 
 75. Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 723. 
 76. Id. at 728. 
 77. Id. at 727–29; see also Bernt, supra note 18, at 318; Carlson, supra note 15, at 320. 
 78. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136,         
136–37 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2018)); Bruntz, supra note 24, at 350; Burdick, supra 
note 1, at 77–78; Carlson, supra note 15, at 321–22; Stafford, supra note 15, at 1227–28. 
 79. Bernt, supra note 18, at 318; Carlson, supra note 15, at 321. 
 80. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 2(3). 
 81. Carlson, supra note 15, at 321. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Burdick, supra note 1, at 78. 
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anything that it ever had included before, and the Supreme Court, relying upon 
the theoretic “expertness” of the Board, upheld the Board.84 
But the critique of Hearst continued.85 The House Report explained, 
In the law, there always has been a difference, and a big difference, between 
“employees” and “independent contractors.” “Employees” work for wages or 
salaries under direct supervision. “Independent contractors” undertake to do a 
job for a price, decide how the work will be done, usually hire others to do the 
work, and depend for their income not upon wages, but upon the difference 
between what they pay for goods, materials, and labor and what they receive 
for the end result, that is, upon profits.86 
The House Report concluded its attack on Hearst with this passage: 
It is inconceivable that Congress, when it passed the act, authorized the Board 
to give to every word in the act whatever meaning it wished. On the contrary, 
Congress intended then, and it intends now, that the Board give to words not 
far-fetched meanings but ordinary meanings. To correct what the Board has 
done, and what the Supreme Court, putting misplaced reliance upon the 
Board’s expertness, has approved, the bill excludes “independent contractors” 
from the definition of “employee.”87 
The Conference Committee Report was less harsh than the House Report.88 Instead, 
it explained, 
The House bill excluded from the definition of “employee” individuals having 
the status of independent contractors. Although independent contractors can 
in no sense be considered to be employees, the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. 
Hearst Publications, Inc. (1944), 322 U.S. 111, held that the ordinary tests of 
the law of agency could be ignored by the Board in determining whether or 
not particular occupational groups were “employees” within the meaning of 
the Labor Act. Consequently it refused to consider the question of whether 
certain categories of persons whom the Board had deemed to be “employees” 
were not in fact and in law really independent contractors.89 
As a result of the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress instructed the NLRB and courts to 
distinguish between employees and independent contractors using general agency 
principles, namely, the preexisting common law test.90 The NLRB and, as demonstrated 
shortly, the Supreme Court took this legislative history to heart and adopted the common 
law multifactor test as the test for distinguishing employees from independent 
contractors.91 
 
 84. H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 18 (1947). 
 85. See Burdick, supra note 1, at 113. 
 86. H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 18. Contra Burdick, supra note 1, at 113–14 (critiquing the House Report’s 
commentary on Hearst). 
 87. H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 18. 
 88. See Burdick, supra note 1, at 119. 
 89. H.R. REP. NO. 80-510, at 32–33 (1947) (Conf. Rep.). 
 90. Burdick, supra note 1, at 121; see Carlson, supra note 15, at 322. 
 91. See Burdick, supra note 1, at 121 (describing how the Supreme Court adopted the right to control 
test); Carlson, supra note 15, at 323–24 (describing the NLRB’s first decision after the Taft-Hartley Act was 
enacted). 
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Interestingly, in 1948, Congress also amended the SSA to exclude “any individual 
who, under the usual common-law rules applicable in determining the 
employer-employee relationship, has the status of an independent contractor” from the 
definition of “employee.”92 And more interestingly, Congress failed to amend the FLSA 
in the same way, so the Supreme Court’s decision in Rutherford Food, which used an 
expansive test and purposivism, still remains in place.93 
Coincidently, about a decade after the Taft-Hartley Act, the American Law Institute 
published the Restatement (Second) of Agency.94 Like the original, it included a 
multifactor test to distinguish between employees and independent contractors but with 
one additional factor—“whether the principal is or is not in business.”95 
The Supreme Court’s definitive ruling on the now-amended NLRA and how to 
distinguish between employees and independent contractors came in 1968, when it 
decided NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America.96 After recounting its decision in 
Hearst and how economic and policy considerations within the labor field set the 
standard, the Court acknowledged Congress’s amendment to the NLRA and declared 
that the common law test was the standard to be used.97 The Court noted that “there is 
no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, but all of 
the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being 
decisive.”98 And although it did not cite to the Restatement’s multifactor test, the Court 
described several of its listed factors.99 Thus, the common law test, with its multitude of 
factors, is the test under the NLRA.100 Consequently, purposivism in interpreting the 
meaning of the term employee has been soundly rejected,101 despite the Restatement’s 
recommendation to the contrary.102 
C. Copyright Act  
The next major development in interpreting the term “employee” in federal law 
came about two decades later in the context of copyright law. This development 
standardized the factors used across statutory schemes adopting the common law 
multifactor test. 
The Copyright Act provides exclusive rights to authors and subsequent copyright 
owners in a wide range of creative works.103 Important for purposes of this study, the act 
 
 92. Bernt, supra note 18, at 318 (quoting Social Security Act of 1948, § 2(a), 62 Stat. 438 (1948) (codified 
as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d) (2018))); Carlson, supra note 15, at 325 (quoting Social Security Act of 
1948, § 2(a)). 
 93. See, e.g., Bernt, supra note 18, at 318; Carlson, supra note 15, at 325; Redfearn, supra note 25, at 
1033 n.46. 
 94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
 95. Id. § 220(2). 
 96. 390 U.S. 254 (1968). 
 97. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256. 
 98. Id. at 258. 
 99. See id. at 259–60. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See Bruntz, supra note 24, at 350; Burdick, supra note 1, at 121. 
 102. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 103. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018). 
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provides that an author is the initial owner of the copyright.104 In many circumstances, 
determining authorship is easy, because the general rule is that “the author is the party 
who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, 
tangible expression.”105 
The exception to this general rule is the work-made-for-hire doctrine.106 In relevant 
part, this doctrine provides that the copyright in “a work prepared by an employee within 
the scope of his or her employment”107 is consequently owned by the employer.108 
Beyond ownership, the work-made-for-hire doctrine is also important because it helps 
determine how long the copyright lasts,109 whether subsequent transfers of the copyright 
can be terminated,110 and whether moral rights exist.111 But like many of the areas of 
federal law, Congress failed to define the term “employee.”112 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Community for Creative 
Non-Violence v. Reid,113 courts used a variety of tests to determine employee status.114 
Some courts focused on whether “the hiring party retains the right to control the 
product.”115 Other courts used the actual control test, which was a variation of the “right 
to control the product” test.116 Under this test, courts looked at whether the hiring party 
actually asserted control over creation of the work.117 
Another test was known as the agency test.118 Under this test, courts determined 
whether a hired party was an employee or independent contractor by using the meaning 
of the word “employee” as understood under agency law.119 Courts applying this test 
 
 104. Id. § 201(a). 
 105. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989). A poet who composes a sonnet 
while overlooking a scenic canyon while on vacation is an easy example of the traditional notion of authorship. 
 106. Vacca, supra note 8, at 198. 
 107. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining work made for hire). 
 108. Id. § 201(b). 
 109. Compare id. § 302(a) (providing that copyright generally persists for the life of the author plus 
seventy years), with id. § 302(c) (providing that copyright in a work made for hire “endures for a term of 95 
years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires 
first”). 
 110. Id. § 203(a) (“In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive 
grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a copyright . . . is subject to termination . . . .”); 
see also id. § 304(c), (d) (showing the same exclusion applies to a different set of transfers). 
 111. See Vacca, supra note 8, at 199. 
 112. Id. at 209. For a full account of the legislative history of this provision, see I.T. Hardy, Copyright 
Law’s Concept of Employment—What Congress Really Intended, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 210, 221–41 
(1988) and Vacca, supra note 8, at 206–09. 
 113. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
 114. See Michael B. Landau, “Works Made for Hire” After Community for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid: The Need for Statutory Reform and the Importance of Contract, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 107,        
120–21 (1990). 
 115. Reid, 490 U.S. at 738 (footnote omitted). 
 116. See id. at 739. 
 117. Id. at 742; Landau, supra note 114, at 123–27. 
 118. Reid, 490 U.S. at 739. 
 119. Vacca, supra note 8, at 213 (citing Easter Seal Soc’y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy 
Enter., 815 F.2d 323, 334–35 (5th Cir. 1987)). 
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used the Restatement (Second) of Agency as a guide, including the factors noted above.120 
The agency test is, in other words, the common law multifactor test.121 
The final test used by the lower courts was the formal, salaried employee test.122 
Under this test, courts initially looked to see if the hired party “[held] himself or herself 
out as a freelancer.”123 If so, then the hiring party should have anticipated the work would 
not be a work made for hire.124 But if the relationship was ambiguous, then courts 
examined a variety of factors, most of which were a subset of the factors identified under 
the agency test.125 These factors included: 
(1) whether the [hired party] worked in his or her own studio or on the 
premises of the [hiring party]; (2) whether the [hiring party] is in the regular 
business of creating works of the type purchased; (3) whether the [hired party] 
works for several [hiring parties] at a time, or exclusively for one; (4) whether 
the [hiring party] retains authority to assign additional projects to the [hired 
party]; (5) the tax treatment of the relationship by the parties; (6) whether the 
[hired party] is hired through the channels the [hiring party] customarily uses 
for hiring new employees; (7) whether the [hired party] is paid a salary or 
wages, or is paid a flat fee; and (8) whether the [hired party] obtains from the 
[hiring party] all benefits customarily extended to its regular employees.126 
Unlike the other tests, the formal, salaried employee test did not inquire into the degree 
of control and input the hiring party exercised.127 
Because of the four different approaches to determining whether a hired party was 
an employee or independent contractor, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Reid to 
resolve this circuit split and interpret what Congress meant by the term “employee” in 
the work-made-for-hire doctrine.128 Ultimately, the Court adopted the common law 
multifactor test (referred to by the Court as the “agency test”) because it was “well 
established that ‘[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning 
under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that 
Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.’”129 Since the 
Court explained, 
Congress used the term “employee” in conjunction with the term “scope of 
employment”—a widely used term of art in agency law—and did not use any 
other language in the statute to indicate that it meant something other than the 
 
 120. Id. at 213–14. 
 121. Creating unnecessary confusion, the Supreme Court referred to the right to control the product test 
as “the right to control test.” Id. at 221. The confusion flows from the Court’s misreading of the right to control 
cases, which actually apply the agency test. Id. The Court reframed these cases as focusing on control of the 
product and subsequently rejected this reframed test. Id. 
 122. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 739. 
 123. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 127. See id. 
 128. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 736 (1989); Vacca, supra note 8, at 
218. 
 129. Reid, 490 U.S. at 739 (omission in original) (alteration in original) (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal 
Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)). 
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common law notion of the relationship between employers and employees, 
the common law test was appropriate.130 
The Court then fleshed out the test.131 First, it stated that in determining whether a 
hired party is an employee, “we consider the hiring party’s right to control the manner 
and means by which the product is accomplished.”132 Next, citing section 220(2) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, the Court listed the following factors as relevant to this 
inquiry: 
[1] the skill required; [2] the source of the instrumentalities and tools; [3] the 
location of the work; [4] the duration of the relationship between the parties; 
[5] whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the 
hired party; [6] the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how 
long to work; [7] the method of payment; [8] the hired party’s role in hiring 
and paying assistants; [9] whether the work is part of the regular business of 
the hiring party; [10] whether the hiring party is in business; [11] the provision 
of employee benefits; and [12] the tax treatment of the hired party.133 
Interestingly, this list of factors is not an exact match with the factors listed in the 
Restatement.134 The Court failed to include some of the Restatement factors and added 
new factors not listed in the Restatement.135 For example, the Court introduced the 
following factors: “the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of 
the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the hired party’s role in 
hiring and paying assistants; and the provision of employee benefits and tax treatment of 
the hired party.”136 Likewise: 
the Court omitted the following factors [listed] in the Restatement: whether or 
not the hired party is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; the kind of 
occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done 
under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; and 
whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relations of master and 
servant.137 
Other than noting that “[n]o one of these factors is determinative,” the Court failed 
to provide any guidance as to how these factors should be balanced.138 In the course of 
justifying the common law multifactor test, the Court explained that this interpretation 
furthered “Congress’ paramount goal in revising the 1976 Act of enhancing predictability 
and certainty of copyright ownership.”139 
 
 130. Vacca, supra note 8, at 219; see also Reid, 490 U.S. at 740. 
 131. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52. 
 132. Id. at 751. 
 133. Id. at 751–52 (footnotes omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1958)). 
 134. Assaf Jacob, Tort Made for Hire—Reconsidering the CCNV Case, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 96, 109 
(2009). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52). 
 137. Id. at 110 (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52). 
 138. Reid, 490 U.S. at 752; Vacca, supra note 8, at 220. 
 139. Reid, 490 U.S. at 749. 
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In addition to its justification for the common law multifactor test, the Court also 
explained why it rejected the other proposed tests.140 The Court explained that the actual 
control test undermined predictability and certainty because the parties would not be able 
to know until late in the process whether the hiring party had actually wielded sufficient 
control over the hired party.141 The Court rejected the right to control the product test 
because it focused on the relationship between the hiring party and the product, rather 
than the hiring and hired parties.142 Finally, the Court rejected the formal, salaried 
employee test because, although there was some support for this approach in the 
legislative history, the statute used the term “employee” rather than “formal employee” 
or “salaried employee” and amici could not agree on the standard under this test.143 
Thus, the Court’s adoption of the common law test in Reid rested primarily on the 
underlying policy concern of enhancing certainty and predictability.144 As illustrated in 
the next Part, in addition to clarifying the test used to distinguish employees from 
independent contractors under the Copyright Act, Reid also served as the foundation for 
generalizing what “employee” means in statutes that do not define it or define it 
circularly. 
D. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
The next major development in interpreting the term “employee” in federal law 
came in the context of ERISA. This development was the key for the generalizability of 
the common law multifactor test across federal legislation. 
Congress designed ERISA to, inter alia, protect the interests of participants in 
employee benefit plans by requiring disclosures; setting standards of conduct; and 
providing remedies, sanctions, and access to federal courts.145 A key issue is whether an 
employee welfare benefit plan, which is governed by ERISA, exists.146 If so, then ERISA 
preempts state law claims.147 
A key element in determining if a plan qualifies as an employee welfare benefit 
plan under ERISA is whether the benefits are provided to participants (or the 
participants’ beneficiaries).148 ERISA defines “participant,” in relevant part, as “any 
employee or former employee of an employer . . . who is or may become eligible to 
receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of 
such employer . . . or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit.”149 
 
 140. See id. at 741–42. 
 141. Id. at 750. 
 142. Id. at 741. As noted above, this was based on a misunderstanding of the test. See supra note 121 for 
a discussion of the Court’s misunderstanding of the test. 
 143. Reid, 490 U.S. at 742 n.8. 
 144. See id. at 749–50. 
 145. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2018). 
 146. See ZANGLEIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 5. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 8. 
 149. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). 
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Thus, employee status is key. But ERISA unhelpfully and circularly defines “employee” 
as “any individual employed by an employer.”150 
Three years after Reid, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Darden151 to resolve what “employee” meant under ERISA.152 The 
district court in Darden applied the common law multifactor test and held the plaintiff 
was an independent contractor rather than an employee.153 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit 
vacated the decision.154 The Fourth Circuit held that although the plaintiff would not 
qualify as an employee under traditional principles of agency law, the declared policies 
and principles of ERISA mandated a broader understanding of employee.155 The Fourth 
Circuit’s decision relied upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hearst and Silk, covering 
the NLRA and SSA, respectively, and took a purposive approach to interpreting the 
term.156 To a certain extent, this approach made sense. Congress designed ERISA to 
provide security and stability to work-based retirement and health benefits, so construing 
“employee” broadly would fulfill the general purpose of the legislation.157 
On appeal, the Supreme Court interpreted “employee” to incorporate the traditional 
agency law criteria for distinguishing between employees and independent 
contractors.158 The Court recounted its then-recent decision in Reid, including the 
principle that when Congress uses terms that have a settled common law meaning, courts 
should infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress meant to incorporate 
that meaning.159 The Court then held that the same rationale applies to ERISA’s 
definition of employee.160 After declaring the common law test applies to ERISA, the 
Court listed the factors noted in Reid and cited to the Restatement (Second) of Agency, 
as well as its NLRA decision in United Insurance.161 At this point, a strong foundation 
had been laid for having a uniform understanding of “employee” across federal law. 
In rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on Hearst and Silk and the principle that 
the term “employee” should be construed “in the light of the mischief to be corrected and 
the end to be attained,” the Court declared that these cases were “feeble precedents for 
unmooring the term from the common law.”162 Although the Court had read the term 
“employee” more broadly in these cases, because Congress amended the statutes to reject 
independent contractors under the common law, these cases did not provide support for 
 
 150. Id. § 1002(6); accord Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (“ERISA’s 
nominal definition of ‘employee’ as ‘any individual employed by an employer’ is completely circular and 
explains nothing.” (citation omitted)). 
 151. 503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
 152. Darden, 503 U.S. at 322. 
 153. Id. at 321. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Carlson, supra note 15, at 332. 
 158. Darden, 503 U.S. at 319. 
 159. Id. at 322–23. 
 160. Id. at 323. 
 161. Id. at 323–24. 
 162. Id. at 324 (quoting Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701, 706 (4th Cir. 1986)). 
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continuing to read other statutes more broadly.163 In addition, the Court noted that the 
Fourth Circuit’s approach was “infected with circularity and unable to furnish predictable 
results.”164 And although acknowledging that the traditional common law multifactor 
test was not a “paradigm of determinacy,” several of the factors were within an 
employer’s knowledge to permit categorical judgments.165 Moreover, by adopting the 
common law test, this would comport with other precedent, such as Reid and United 
Insurance.166 Thus, Darden formally abandoned Hearst’s and Silk’s purposive approach 
to construing the term “employee” in federal statutes and, like in Reid, focused on 
promoting certainty and predictability not just for employers but across federal statutory 
schemes.167 
E.  Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 
Three months after Darden, the Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission (OSHRC) was confronted with the issue of how to distinguish employees 
from independent contractors under OSHA. Congress enacted OSHA in 1970 after 
decades of industry-specific legislation.168 The purpose of OSHA is “to assure so far as 
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working 
conditions and to preserve our human resources.”169 To this end, OSHA requires an 
employer to “furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment 
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or 
serious physical harm to his employees”170 and to comply with promulgated OSHA 
standards.171 
As such, only an “employer” may be cited for a violation of the act.172 Like with 
the NLRA and ERISA, the definitions in OSHA are circular. “Employer” is defined as 
“a person engaged in a business affecting commerce who has employees,” but not 
federal, state, or local governments.173 Unhelpfully, “employee” is defined as “an 
employee of an employer who is employed in a business of his employer which affects 
commerce.”174 
Prior to Darden, the OSHRC had considered several factors in determining whether 
someone was an employee, including: 
(1) Whom do the workers consider their employer? 
(2) Who pays the workers’ wages? 
 
 163. Id. at 324–25. 
 164. Id. at 326. 
 165. Id. at 327. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See id. at 324–27; Carlson, supra note 15, at 333, 338. 
 168. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590; MARK A. 
ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 4 (2019). 
 169. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2018). 
 170. Id. § 654(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 171. Id. § 654(b); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 168, at 9. 
 172. Vergona Crane Co., 15 BNA OSHC 1782, 1783, 1992 WL 184539, at *1 (No. 88–1745, 1992). 
 173. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5). 
 174. Id. § 652(6). 
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(3) Who has the responsibility to control the workers? 
(4) Does the alleged employer have the power to control the workers? 
(5) Does the alleged employer have the power to fire, hire, or modify the 
employment condition of the workers? 
(6) Does the workers’ ability to increase their income depend on efficiency rather 
than initiative, judgment, and foresight? 
(7) How are the workers’ wages established?175 
But in Secretary of Labor v. Vergona Crane Co.,176 the OSHRC noted that the 
Supreme Court had recently decided Darden and held that, unless indicated otherwise, 
the term “employee” in federal statutes should be interpreted under the common law test 
using the factors laid out in Reid.177 Although the OSHRC did not officially reject its 
prior approach to determining employee status in Vergona Crane,178 the vast majority of 
the decision focused on the Reid factors.179 Of note, the OSHRC in Vergona Crane did 
not reject purposivism or articulate any other animating principles for adopting the 
common law test.180 
In subsequent decisions, the OSHRC and courts interpreting OSHA have adopted 
Darden and Reid as the applicable test.181 Although the Supreme Court has not yet 
definitively declared that the common law multifactor test determines “employee” under 
OSHA, the OSHRC and courts have seen the writing on the wall.182 
F. Antidiscrimination Statutes 
A final area of federal law where the distinction between employee and independent 
contractor status is important is the antidiscrimination statutes, namely Title VII, the 
ADA, and the ADEA. These acts prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, national origin, disability, and age, but only protect employees, not 
independent contractors.183 
 
 175. Vergona Crane, 1992 WL 184539, at *2 (citing Van Buren-Madawaska Corp., 13 BNA OSHC 2157, 
2158 (No. 87–214, 1989)). 
 176. 15 BNA OSHC 1782, 1992 WL 184539 (No. 88–1745, 1992). 
 177. Vergona Crane, 1992 WL 184539, at *2–3. 
 178. Id. at *5 (reasoning that the result in the case was the same regardless of which test applied). 
 179. See id. at *3–4. 
 180. See id. at *2–5. 
 181. See, e.g., Absolute Roofing & Constr., Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 580 F. App’x 357, 361, 363 n.3 (6th 
Cir. 2014); Slingluff v. OSHRC, 425 F.3d 861, 867–68 (10th Cir. 2005); Loomis Cabinet Co. v. OSHRC, 20 
F.3d 938, 941–42 (9th Cir. 1994); R&S Roofing, LLC, 24 BNA OSHC 2151, 2014 WL 901286, at *3–4 (No. 
12-2427, 2014) (ALJ). But see Sec’y of Labor v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 504 F.3d 397, 402 (3d Cir. 2007) (rejecting 
Darden as the standard for OSHA). 
 182. Bodie, supra note 15, at 679–81. 
 183. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2)–(3) (2018) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2018) (Title VII); id. 
§§ 12112(a)–(b)(1), 12112(b)(5)(A) (ADA); e.g., Carlson, supra note 15, at 363 (listing characteristics against 
which discrimination is prohibited in antidiscrimination acts); Maltby & Yamada, supra note 2, at 239–40 
(explaining that antidiscrimination acts only prohibit such discrimination against employees and not independent 
contractors); Menetrez, supra note 10, at 143 (affirming that antidiscrimination protections extend only to 
employees and not independent contractors). 
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Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to limit, segregate, or classify his 
employees . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”184 The ADEA 
uses identical language but prohibits discrimination based on the employee’s age and 
prohibits “reduc[ing] the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this 
chapter.”185 And the ADA prohibits employers from “limiting, segregating, or 
classifying a[n] . . . employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status 
of such . . . employee because of the disability of such . . . employee”186 and “not making 
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability who is an . . . employee, unless” the employer can 
demonstrate that doing so would impose an undue hardship.187 Thus, an individual who 
is an independent contractor, rather than an employee, would not be a proper plaintiff 
under the antidiscrimination statutes.188 
Furthermore, these acts only apply to employers with a certain number of 
employees.189 Title VII and the ADA only apply to employers with fifteen or more 
employees.190 And the ADEA only applies to employers with twenty or more 
employees.191 Thus, a case under the antidiscrimination statutes will be dismissed if the 
defendant is not properly classified as an employer, which depends on determining the 
number of employees.192 
Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA define the term “employee” in a similar 
way: “An individual employed by an employer.”193 Because of this, these 
antidiscrimination acts can be grouped together when considering how to distinguish 
between employees and independent contractors.194 But as with ERISA, the NLRA, and 
OSHA, the definitions under the antidiscrimination acts are completely circular and 
explain nothing.195 The legislative histories provide little assistance.196 For example, the 
legislative history of Title VII states that “employee” is “defined for the purposes of this 
title in the manner common for Federal statutes.”197 Therefore, as with the other federal 
statutes, the task of determining the test for employee status has been left to the courts.198 
 
 184. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 185. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2)–(3) (emphasis added). 
 186. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 187. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). 
 188. Menetrez, supra note 10, at 145. 
 189. Carlson, supra note 15, at 363. 
 190. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 12111(5). 
 191. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). 
 192. See Menetrez, supra note 10, at 145. 
 193. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (Title VII); id. § 12111(4) (ADA). 
 194. See Maltby & Yamada, supra note 2, at 241. 
 195. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444 (2003); Menetrez, supra 
note 10, at 144. 
 196. Davidson, supra note 11, at 206–07. 
 197. H.R. REP. NO. 88–914, at 27 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2402. 
 198. Davidson, supra note 11, at 206–07. 
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Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates v. 
Wells,199 the lower courts used a variety of approaches for determining who counted as 
an employee under the antidiscrimination statutes.200 Some courts saw the writing on the 
wall in Darden and used the common law multifactor test.201 Others applied a broader, 
economic realities test as used under the FLSA.202 And others used a hybrid test, which 
combined aspects of the previous two.203 
Finally, in 2003, the Supreme Court provided clear guidance on this issue in Wells. 
Technically, Wells dealt with the issue of whether shareholders and directors of a 
professional corporation counted as employees under the ADA rather than how to 
distinguish between employees and independent contractors.204 Nonetheless, the Court’s 
broad pronouncement of the law in Wells solidified that the common law multifactor test 
is applicable to these antidiscrimination acts.205 
The Court in Wells began its discussion by referring to Darden and its holding that 
the common law test applied when Congress uses the term “employee” without defining 
it (or nominally defining it).206 The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s purposive 
approach, which focused on the purpose of the ADA: “ridding the Nation of the evil of 
discrimination.”207 The Court rejected this purposive approach because there was a 
conflicting policy goal of sparing smaller firms from the ADA’s reach208 and because 
Congress had previously “overridden judicial decisions that went beyond the common 
law in an effort to correct ‘the mischief’ at which a statute was aimed.”209 
The Court then adopted the common law multifactor test.210 It cited the 
Restatement’s list of factors and noted the particular importance of the right to control.211 
Buttressing its argument was the fact that the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, which enforces the ADA and other antidiscrimination acts, used the 
Darden and Reid factors to distinguish between employees and independent 
contractors.212 Although Wells was an ADA case and the Supreme Court had not 
specifically addressed which test should be used under Title VII and the ADEA, given 
that the Court noted the similar definition of “employee” in these acts, the Court clearly 
intended Wells to apply to all three antidiscrimination acts.213 
 
 199. 538 U.S. 440 (2003). 
 200. Menetrez, supra note 10, at 148, 157. 
 201. See id. at 148; see also Bodie, supra note 15, at 679. 
 202. Menetrez, supra note 10, at 148. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Wells, 538 U.S. at 442. 
 205. Id. at 448; Bodie, supra note 15, at 679–80; Menetrez, supra note 10, at 157–58. 
 206. Wells, 538 U.S. at 444–45. 
 207. Id. at 446–47. 
 208. Id. at 447. 
 209. Id. (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324–25 (1992)). 
 210. Bodie, supra note 15, at 679–80. 
 211. Wells, 538 U.S. at 448 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1958)). 
 212. Id. at 448–49. With respect to the narrower issue in Wells—whether shareholders or directors 
qualified as employees—the Court adopted a modified test that focused on six factors that are more closely 
aligned with the unique relationship between a company and its shareholders or directors. Id. at 449–50. 
 213. Menetrez, supra note 10, at 157 n.119. 
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Interestingly, in a dissenting opinion in Wells, Justice Ginsburg noted that the hiring 
party should not be able to avoid liability by not counting shareholders and directors as 
employees for antidiscrimination purposes when it selected this business entity to qualify 
these same individuals as employees for ERISA purposes.214 Justice Ginsburg seemed 
troubled by the inconsistency in this case,215 and this is especially so given the nearly 
identical, circular definitions of “employee” under the antidiscrimination statutes and 
ERISA. As applied to the facts of Wells, there seems to be inconsistent treatment of the 
hired parties under ERISA and the ADA despite the rejection of a purposive approach to 
interpreting the statutes. 
By 2003, the Supreme Court had adopted or strongly hinted at adoption of the 
common law multifactor test for many major federal statutory schemes that rely on the 
distinction between employees and independent contractors. And in many of these cases, 
it expressly rejected a purposive approach to interpreting the term “employee.”216 
Moreover, the animating policy concerns for some of these interpretations were 
furthering predictability and certainty for affected parties.217 
But in none of the cases did the Court indicate which factors, if any, in the common 
law multifactor test were most important. And although predictability and certainty 
within and between statutes were oftentimes important driving forces, we are left to 
wonder whether this result has been achieved. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
This study answers the questions left open after adoption of the common law 
multifactor test discussed above. It determines which factors are the most and least 
important and whether the policy concerns of predictability and certainty, which led to 
the adoption of this test, are being furthered. This Section describes the methodology 
used in this study, including a general description of content analysis218 and the specific 
data collected.219 
 
 214. Wells, 538 U.S. at 453 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 215. See id. (“I see no reason to allow the doctors to escape from their choice of corporate form when the 
question becomes whether they are employees for purposes of federal antidiscrimination statutes.”). 
 216. See supra notes 100–01, 166–67, 206–08 and accompanying text. 
 217. In 2006, the American Law Institute published the Restatement (Third) of Agency that modernized 
the language from section 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency (changing “servant” to “employee”) but 
kept right to control as the standard. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 
1958), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). Despite the modernization, the 
doctrine remains the same, although the factors were moved to the comments rather than remaining in the text. 
Id. § 7.07 cmt. f; Bodie, supra note 15, at 677 n.81. 
 218. See infra Part II.A. 
 219. See infra Part II.B. 
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A. Overall Approach 
This study’s basic methodology is the well-established content analysis 
technique.220 Researchers using content analysis “systematically read and empirically 
analyze textual data sources.”221 As empirical legal scholar Jason Rantanen described, 
Underlying the technique of content analysis is the fundamental idea that 
judicial opinions should be read systematically and relevant information about 
each opinion recorded while or shortly after the opinion is read. Content 
analysis thus holds as its goal the creation of a set of systematically collected 
data—that, ideally, can be empirically tested—about the shape and contours 
of the law, and stands in contrast to other approaches to legal scholarship that 
focus on carefully interpreting a small set of opinions that are considered 
“important.”222 
Content analysis involves three steps.223 First, the researcher collects cases likely 
containing information about the issues being explored.224 Second, the researcher 
systematically reads and codes the collected cases to collect basic information about the 
case itself and case content relating to the relevant legal issues.225 Finally, the researcher 
analyzes data, describes patterns, and, if applicable, tests hypotheses.226 
As with any methodology, limitations exist.227 With a content analysis study, 
reproducibility and subjectivity are two issues that may undermine a study’s 
reliability.228 With reproducibility, the concern is whether others can take the same steps 
and come up with the same results.229 To maximize reproducibility, a researcher should 
follow standardized procedures when collecting and coding data.230 The procedures used 
in this study are described below. 
The second concern is subjectivity—the coders entering information based on their 
own beliefs and interpretations rather than the content of the case itself.231 Although 
every datum of a case and its content could involve some measure of subjectivity, 
reproducibility may be maximized by following a set of best practices.232 Some 
information in this study was either obtained directly from Westlaw or automatically 
coded by a computer, and involved no human determinations.233 Despite attempts to 
 
 220. See generally KIMBERLY A. NEUENDORF, THE CONTENT ANALYSIS GUIDEBOOK 1 (2002) (describing 
content analysis and noting that it “is perhaps the fastest-growing technique in quantitative research”). 
 221. Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study, 16 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 722 (2013). 
 222. Id. at 722–23 (footnote omitted). 
 223. Id. at 723. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 723–24. 
 229. See NEUENDORF, supra note 220, at 112. 
 230. See Rantanen, supra note 221, at 723. 
 231. Id. at 723–24. 
 232. Id. at 723. 
 233. These data included case name; citation; URL; tribunal name; which regional circuit, if any, the 
tribunal falls within; and the year the case was decided. 
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automate much of the coding, humans collected a great deal of the information, which 
involved subjective determinations. To minimize subjectivity and maximize 
reproducibility and reliability, the vast majority of the coding was categorical, which, as 
described below, required coders to make an assessment within a set of predetermined 
and predefined categories.  
To address reproducibility and subjectivity, independent coders read a sample of 
cases and coded the applicable fields pursuant to the codebook.234 The reliability of the 
coding was assessed using either average pairwise percent agreement235 or Fleiss’ 
kappa.236 Average pairwise percent agreement, although it is not a perfect measure of 
intercoder reliability because it does not account for chance agreement, gives a fairly 
strong indication of agreement especially when there is little variation in the coding.237 
Fleiss’ kappa accounts for chance agreement and is superior to the commonly used 
Cohen’s kappa in this scenario because Fleiss’ kappa can be used to calculate the 
reliability for three or more coders.238 The results of the intercoder reliability testing 
provide a strong indication of the reproducibility and lack of subjectivity of the results 
reported in this Article.239 
Although reliability is important to consider in content analysis studies, doing so in 
the context of cases raises additional concerns, including unobserved reasoning, selection 
bias, and strategic behavior.240 Drawing conclusions about legal principles based on 
judicial opinions assumes that the opinion is an accurate representation of the judge’s 
thoughts on the issue.241 But this assumption might be false.242 The author of the opinion 
might fail to reveal his or her true reasoning.243 Another concern is selection bias.244 
 
 234. See infra Appendix B for the codebook. 
 235. See NEUENDORF, supra note 220, at 161. 
 236. KILEM LI GWET, HANDBOOK OF INTER-RATER RELIABILITY 87 (4th ed. 2014); see also NEUENDORF, 
supra note 220, at 161. 
 237. NEUENDORF, supra note 220, at 149; see also CRISTINA GRISOT, COHESION, COHERENCE AND 
TEMPORAL REFERENCE FROM AN EXPERIMENTAL CORPUS PRAGMATICS PERSPECTIVE 139 (2018) (discussing the 
importance of avoiding the problem of chance agreement through chance-corrected coefficients). 
 238. See GWET, supra note 236, at 87 n.4; NEUENDORF, supra note 220, at 161. One limitation of Fleiss’ 
kappa is that it can only be used for nominal data, but because the human-coded variables in this study are 
nominal, its use is proper. GWET, supra note 236, at 87 n.4. 
 239. To calculate the average pairwise percent agreement and Fleiss’ kappa, thirty cases from the 
collection of cases were randomly sampled, and each coder independently coded values for all of the 
human-entered fields in the study. Each coders’ entries were then copied into spreadsheets for each variable and 
the average pairwise percent agreement and Fleiss’ kappa were calculated using ReCal3. See Deen Freelon, 
ReCal3: Reliability for 3+ Coders, DFREELON.ORG, http://dfreelon.org/utils/recalfront/recal3/ 
[https://perma.cc/8WWG-KSFS] (last visited Nov. 1, 2019). Appendix A reports the results of the intercoder 
reliability testing. I performed several rounds of intercoder reliability testing with adjustments made to the 
codebook after each round. As illustrated in Appendix A, every variable had either an average pairwise percent 
agreement above 90% or a Fleiss’ kappa above 0.750. Although there is no firmly established benchmark for 
Fleiss’ kappa, at least one expert in intercoder reliability explains that a Fleiss’ kappa above 0.75 is considered 
excellent. GWET, supra note 236, at 167. 
 240. Rantanen, supra note 221, at 724. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
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Cases available in commercial databases are a subset of all filed cases, which is a subset 
of all potential cases that could have been filed.245 There is also the potential for strategic 
behavior by judges or the parties, such as emphasizing particular legal issues or 
factors.246 
A final limitation on judicial opinion-based content analyses such as this one relates 
to their predictive power.247 This study describes which factors were more or less 
relevant in the employee status analysis under a variety of federal statutes over several 
time periods. Predictive conclusions based on this analysis should be made with caution 
as the composition of the bench changes, judges’ interpretations of the facts and factors 
may shift over time, new cases arise that present novel fact patterns, and external changes 
may influence how courts interpret these legal issues.248 In addition, prior decisions may 
influence what types of cases are filed, which can result in selection effects.249 
Despite the limitations, content analysis is still a useful technique.250 Although 
subjectivity exists and judges’ jurisprudence is not fully revealed through their opinions, 
consider the traditional form of legal analysis.251 In traditional legal analysis, court 
opinions are read and conclusions are drawn about their meaning.252 In other words, their 
content is analyzed.253 Content analysis is simply a system whereby cases are read 
systematically and the results are methodically recorded.254 Using this process can reveal 
trends and aspects of the law that have gone unobserved.255 And notwithstanding the 
limitation regarding predictive values, courts typically decide future cases with reference 
to prior opinions.256 Thus, this study provides individuals and businesses planning their 
relationships, as well as litigants, with a sense of how the status of their hired parties will 
be determined if a dispute arises. 
B. Data Collection 
This study systematically examines and codes the universe of cases where the status 
of the hired party has been determined using the common law multifactor test from the 
time the Supreme Court (or other controlling authority) adopted this test. To assemble 
the datasets to code, I ran broad searches in Westlaw from the dates of the controlling 
Supreme Court case (or other authority) through February 19, 2018. The table below 
shows the start date for each type of case and the relevant case name. 
 
 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 724–25. 
 247. Id. at 725. 
 248. Id. 
 249. See Robert E. Thomas, The Trial Selection Hypothesis Without the 50 Percent Rule: Some 
Experimental Evidence, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 210 (1995). 
 250. Rantanen, supra note 221, at 726. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. See id. 
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Type of Case Start Date 
NLRA257 March 6, 1968 (United Insurance) 
Copyright258 June 5, 1989 (Reid) 
ERISA259 March 24, 1992 (Darden) 
OSHA260 July 22, 1992 (Vergona Crane) 
Title VII261 April 22, 2003 (Wells) 
ADA262 April 22, 2003 (Wells) 
ADEA263 April 22, 2003 (Wells) 
 
These searches resulted in several hundred to several thousand results for each 
category. To exclude the false positives, my research assistants and I screened every 
case264 to make sure it actually was an opinion where the court or agency determined the 
status of the hired party using the common law multifactor test, and that the court or 
agency actually interpreted the relevant statute.265 We also randomly selected screened 
cases to double-check screening accuracy. Ninety-six percent of these cases were 
 
 257. Two searches were conducted for NLRA cases. One was for court cases and the other was for cases 
before the National Labor Relations Board and its Division of Judges. For court cases, the search was in 
Westlaw’s “All State and Federal Cases” database and included the following search: (nlra nlrb) & (employee 
/p factor!) & (“common law” “right to control”). For NLRB cases, the search was in Westlaw’s “NLRB Board 
& ALJ Decisions” database and included the following search: (employee /p factor!) & (“common law” “right 
to control”). 
 258. Because I had already completed a study of the relevant copyright cases through June 5, 2014, which 
included searches in Westlaw, Lexis, and Bloomberg, I ran a Westlaw search from June 5, 2014, through 
February 19, 2018, and supplemented my existing dataset with the newly decided copyright cases. The Westlaw 
search was in the “All State and Federal Cases” database and included the following search: employee /p (“work 
for hire” “work made for hire”) /p factor!. 
 259. The search for ERISA cases was in Westlaw’s “All State and Federal Cases” database and included 
the following search: ERISA & (employee /p factor!) & (“common law” “right to control”). 
 260. Two searches were conducted for OSHA cases. One was for court cases and the other was for cases 
before the OSHRC. For court cases, the search was in Westlaw’s “All State and Federal Cases” database and 
included the following search: osha & (employee /p factor!) & (“common law” “right to control”). For OSHRC 
cases, the search was in Westlaw’s “Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission” database and included 
the following search: (employee /p factor!) & (“common law” “right to control”). 
 261. The search for Title VII cases was in Westlaw’s “All State and Federal Cases” database and included 
the following search: “title vii” & (employee /p factor!) & (“common law” “right to control”). 
 262. The search for ADA cases was in Westlaw’s “All State and Federal Cases” database and included 
the following search: ADA & disabilit! & (employee /p factor!) & (“common law” “right to control”). 
 263. The search for ADEA cases was in Westlaw’s “All State and Federal Cases” database and included 
the following search: adea & age & (employee /p factor!) & (“common law” “right to control”). 
 264. The only exceptions to screening all of the cases were ERISA and Title VII, where there were 
approximately 2,500 and 3,000 cases, respectively. For these two searches, we only screened the first 1,000 
cases. The reason for this, as opposed to randomly selecting 1,000 cases, was that Westlaw sorted the cases in 
terms of relevance. Although we do not know how Westlaw makes this determination, based on the results of 
the other searches, Westlaw’s algorithm did a pretty reliable job of ensuring the cases meeting the screening 
criteria were near the top of the result list. The end results of each search were nearly 100% false positives, so 
we felt comfortable using the first 1,000 cases to capture the universe of relevant ERISA and Title VII cases. 
 265. Most false positives were cases analyzing a different statute than the one at issue in the search. For 
example, in a search for ADA cases, a false positive might include an ERISA case addressing the same issue. 
Although eliminated from the ADA results, the ERISA case would be captured in the ERISA search described 
above. 
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accurately screened.266 After combining all of the relevant cases, I deduplicated the data 
to avoid double counting.267 This resulted in the following breakdown of relevant cases 
for each type of case. 
 
Type of Case 
Number of Relevant 
Cases 
NLRA Court Cases 45 
NLRA Board Cases 160 




Title VII 121 
ADA 34 
ADEA 43 
Combined Antidiscrimination (ADA, ADEA, 
Title VII) 183 
Total Unique Cases 546 
 
For each relevant case, my research assistants and I manually recorded the 
following information: (1) whether the tribunal concluded the hired party was an 
employee or independent contractor; (2) the direction of each of the traditional Supreme 
Court’s factors—that is, whether each factor favored employee status, independent 
contractor status, was indeterminate, or was not addressed by the tribunal; (3) the weight 
of each factor—that is, whether the tribunal gave additional weight to the particular 
factor, discounted the factor, or did not expressly weigh the factor; and (4) whether the 
tribunal cited binding or persuasive authority for the proposition that some factors are 
more or less important than others. We based all of this information on statements (or 
the absence of statements) by the tribunals. 
Because the Supreme Court’s common law test is a nonexclusive list of factors, we 
recorded and coded additional factors the tribunals discussed in their analyses just as the 
traditional factors. One factor the tribunals frequently addressed was how the hired and 
hiring parties referred to the hired party. Because of its prevalence, we treated this factor 
as part of the traditional common law factors. 
 
 266. All errors were cases screened as relevant, but in fact, were false positives. Presumably these cases 
would have been eliminated during the coding process. Based on the random inspection, no cases were 
mistakenly excluded from the dataset of relevant cases. 
 267. This process involved eliminating lower tribunal opinions that were fully addressed by a relevant 
higher authority (i.e., conducted its own analysis of the factors). This included removing trial court opinions that  
appellate courts reversed and trial court opinions that appellate courts affirmed but with the appellate court 
providing its own analysis. Deduplicating also involved removing instances of the same tribunal later modifying 
or reconsidering its own analysis in the same case. For NLRA cases, which I separated into court cases and 
agency cases, I kept NLRB decisions where the court of appeals affirmed employee status analyses (six cases in 
total). This was done to see if the NLRB analyzes the factors differently than courts do. When both types of 
NLRA decisions were combined, I removed the six NLRB cases from the analysis to avoid double counting. 
 268. Although I ran separate searches, only four of the seventy cases were court cases, so they were 
combined with the agency cases.  
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In addition to the manually-coded data, some data was automatically coded, such 
as case name; citation; URL; tribunal name; which judicial circuit, if any, the tribunal 
falls within; the date the tribunal decided the case; and whether the tribunal decided the 
case before the Supreme Court’s decision in Wells. The codebook found in Appendix B 
provides the complete procedure for data collection, along with a description of each 
field. 
III. RESULTS 
Using this data, I made the following calculations: how frequently the tribunals 
addressed each factor, how consistent each factor was with the ultimate result of the hired 
party’s status, and how frequently the tribunals’ analyses gave additional weight or 
discounted each factor. These calculations are shown in the summary tables below as 
Frequency,269 Consistency,270 Favored Weighting,271 and Discounted Weighting,272 
respectively.273 
These calculations all measure, in some form, the importance of the factors. The 
frequency with which a factor is analyzed suggests whether tribunals are considering the 
factor in the first place or simply ignoring it. A frequently ignored factor is less likely to 
be important than one frequently addressed. Likewise, consistency illustrates 
importance, because a factor that is less reliable in predicting the ultimate outcome 
suggests that courts treat that factor as having less impact on the ultimate result than other 
factors.274 Finally, whether a factor is discounted or given additional weight in the 
analysis reflects its importance as the tribunals are directly addressing which factors they 
take more seriously and find more probative in the analysis as well as which factors they 
declare to be of less importance. 
Although each calculation by itself is helpful in understanding the importance of a 
particular factor in the employee-independent contractor analysis, no single calculation 
can tell the entire story. As a result, all of the calculations must be examined together to 
discover which factors are the most and least important. Based on all four calculations in 
each table below, I propose the continua shown in the figures in each Part, which describe 
the relative importance of common law factors for that particular act. Whether a 
particular factor belongs one group down or one group up in the continua is certainly 
 
 269. Frequency for each factor is calculated as the number of total cases minus the number of cases in 
which the factor was not addressed by the tribunals. 
 270. Consistency for each factor is calculated by adding the total number of cases where the factor’s 
outcome is consistent with the tribunal’s ultimate conclusion about the hired party’s status. For example, if the 
skill-required factor favors a finding of employee status and the court ultimately concludes the hired party is an 
employee, then this is consistent. If, however, the court finds that the skill-required factor favors a finding of 
employee status, but the court ultimately concludes the hired party is an independent contractor, then this is 
inconsistent. The percentage in parentheses is calculated by dividing this number by the number in the Frequency 
column. In other words, when the factor is addressed, how consistent is it with the ultimate conclusion? 
 271. Favored Weighting for each factor is calculated by adding together the total number of cases where 
the factor is given additional weight. The percentage in parentheses is calculated by dividing this number by the 
number in the Frequency column. In other words, when this factor is addressed, how often is it favored? 
 272. Discounted Weighting for each factor is calculated the same way as Favored Weighting but counts 
cases where the factor is discounted rather than given additional weight. 
 273. Tables for each calculation as sorted by that calculation’s percentage are found in Appendix C. 
 274. Inconsistent factors are also less useful to the parties and attorneys in predicting outcomes. 
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debatable; reasonable minds can differ. Illustrating the importance of the factors using 
continua with dashed lines rather than strict lines of demarcation between the groups was 
purposefully chosen to acknowledge this. 
To test how useful these groups are at predicting outcomes, I analyzed the factors 
in the various groups to see if more than fifty percent of the addressed factors favored 
the ultimate outcome. If so, I considered this a successful prediction. Otherwise, I 
considered it an unsuccessful prediction. I added the total successful predictions together 
and then divided by the total number of cases to calculate a measure for determining how 
many of the total cases could be accurately predicted based on the factor(s) in the 
group(s). I performed the same analysis with the least important and the middle groups. 
These accuracy percentages are displayed in the figures below. At the conclusion of each 
Part, I explain notable results peculiar to that legislation and note interesting results 
worthy of further study. 
A. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 
For the NLRA, the tables and continua below illustrate the courts’ and NLRB’s 
treatments of the factors since the Supreme Court’s decision in United Insurance. 
Because the NLRA cases consist of both decisions from the NLRB and courts, this study 
examines the factors for all NLRA cases and also separates out NLRB and court cases to 
see if they are treated the same or differently. 
 
Table 1 
Combined NLRA (Board and Court) 
(March 6, 1968 – February 19, 2018) 





Right to control 
manner and means 67% (134) 94% (126) 16% (21) 1% (1) 
Skill required 23% (45) 76% (34) 0% (0) 2% (1) 
Source of 
instrumentalities and 
tools 75% (149) 69% (103) 1% (1) 5% (8) 
Work location 38% (76) 80% (61) 0% (0) 3% (2) 
Relationship duration 28% (56) 63% (35) 2% (1) 4% (2) 
Additional projects 45% (89) 84% (75) 1% (1) 3% (3) 
When and how long to 
work 63% (125) 72% (90) 2% (2) 6% (8) 
Payment method 72% (143) 69% (98) 6% (8) 3% (5) 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 52% (104) 70% (73) 3% (3) 6% (6) 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 30% (59) 73% (43) 3% (2) 3% (2) 
Hiring party in 
business 3% (6) 100% (6) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Employee benefits 55% (109) 59% (64) 1% (1) 4% (4) 
Tax treatment 64% (127) 54% (69) 2% (2) 2% (3) 
Label 46% (91) 62% (56) 3% (3) 4% (4) 
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Table 2  
NLRA Board Decisions  
(March 6, 1968 – February 19, 2018) 





Right to control 
manner and means 73% (117) 94% (110) 13% (15) 1% (1) 
Skill required 21% (34) 71% (24) 0% (0) 3% (1) 
Source of 
instrumentalities and 
tools 74% (119) 68% (81) 0% (0) 4% (5) 
Work location 36% (58) 83% (48) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Relationship duration 26% (41) 63% (26) 2% (1) 2% (1) 
Additional projects 44% (70) 80% (56) 1% (1) 3% (2) 
When and how long to 
work 61% (97) 70% (69) 2% (2) 4% (4) 
Payment method 72% (115) 69% (79) 3% (4) 2% (2) 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 53% (84) 73% (61) 2% (2) 2% (2) 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 31% (50) 78% (39) 4% (2) 0% (0) 
Hiring party in 
business 4% (6) 100% (6) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Employee benefits 56% (89) 55% (49) 1% (1) 4% (4) 
Tax treatment 64% (102) 51% (52) 1% (1) 2% (2) 
Label 44% (70) 61% (43) 3% (2) 6% (4) 
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Table 3  
NLRA Court Decisions  
(March 6, 1968 – February 19, 2018) 





Right to control 
manner and means 44% (20) 95% (19) 30% (6) 0% (0) 
Skill required 24% (11) 91% (10) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Source of 
instrumentalities and 
tools 76% (34) 76% (26) 3% (1) 9% (3) 
Work location 44% (20) 75% (15) 0% (0) 10% (2) 
Relationship duration 38% (17) 65% (11) 0% (0) 6% (1) 
Additional projects 47% (21) 100% (21) 0% (0) 5% (1) 
When and how long to 
work 69% (31) 77% (24) 0% (0) 13% (4) 
Payment method 71% (32) 63% (20) 16% (5) 9% (3) 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 49% (22) 64% (14) 5% (1) 18% (4) 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 24% (11) 55% (6) 0% (0) 18% (2) 
Hiring party in 







Employee benefits 53% (24) 67% (16) 0% (0) 4% (1) 
Tax treatment 67% (30) 60% (18) 3% (1) 7% (2) 
Label 53% (24) 58% (14) 4% (1) 0% (0) 
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There are a few interesting observations to make with respect to the NLRA cases. 
First, right to control is less important to courts than to the NLRB. The main difference 
between them is that the NLRB more frequently considers the right to control factor than 
the courts (73% versus 44%). Second, work location seems slightly less significant for 
courts than the NLRB. Although addressed more frequently (44% versus 36%), the work 
location consistency is lower (75% versus 83%) and discounting is higher (10% versus 
0%). Third, the work being part of the regular business of the hiring party is more 
important for the NLRB than courts. This factor is addressed less frequently (31% versus 
24%), is quite a bit less consistent (78% versus 55%), and is much more heavily 
discounted by the courts (0% versus 18%). 
With respect to the continua, it is interesting that the NLRA continua (especially 
for the NLRB) fit well with the House Report accompanying the Taft-Hartley Act 
suggesting that payment method, hiring assistants, and right to control are the key 
factors.275 In addition, it is remarkable that the accuracy of the top two groups is quite 
low in comparison to other examined legislation (except for the ADA). This suggests 
that consistency and predictability are lacking. 
B. Copyright Act 
For the Copyright Act, the summary table and continuum below illustrate the 
courts’ treatment of the factors since the Supreme Court’s decision in Reid. 
 
 
 275. See supra text accompanying note 86. 
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Table 4  
Copyright Act 
(June 5, 1989 – February 19, 2018) 





Right to control 
manner and means 80% (41) 59% (24) 17% (7) 12% (5) 
Skill required 55% (28) 86% (24) 36% (10) 4% (1) 
Source of 
instrumentalities and 
tools 73% (37) 89% (33) 5% (2) 3% (1) 
Work location 73% (37) 76% (28) 0% (0) 11% (4) 
Relationship duration 63% (32) 81% (26) 6% (2) 6% (2) 
Additional projects 67% (34) 85% (29) 26% (9) 3% (1) 
When and how long to 
work 67% (34) 82% (28) 0% (0) 6% (2) 
Payment method 86% (44) 84% (37) 14% (6) 2% (1) 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 37% (19) 74% (14) 0% (0) 11% (2) 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 63% (32) 84% (27) 0% (0) 13% (4) 
Hiring party in 
business 18% (9) 44% (4) 0% (0) 33% (3) 
Employee benefits 78% (40) 90% (36) 38% (15) 5% (2) 
Tax treatment 80% (41) 85% (35) 34% (14) 7% (3) 
Label 20% (10) 50% (5) 10% (1) 30% (3) 
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As described in a previous article, the right to control factor is not of much 
importance.276 That said, it has become slightly more important over the last few years. 
Also, skill is notably important. When considered in light of legislation revolving around 
creativity, it is not surprising that this factor stands out. Of course, that also fits with a 
purposive approach, which the Supreme Court has strongly rejected.277 Another factor 
of interest is the label the parties use to describe their relationship. The courts have 
determined that this factor is mostly unimportant. Instead, courts look beyond the label 
the parties affix and see what really occurs between the parties. 
When looking at the continuum, it is remarkable that using the top three       
factors—payment method, benefits, and tax treatment—leads to 86% accuracy in 
predictability. These factors were key factors in the formal, salaried employee test the 
Supreme Court rejected in Reid.278 Despite its rejection, it looks like the formal, salaried 
employee test is, in actuality, driving the outcomes in these cases. These results are 
consistent with the previous study and the same observations apply today.279 If certainty 
and predictability are of primary importance, as the Supreme Court explained in Reid, 
then perhaps using a subset of the factors makes more sense. 
C. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
For ERISA, the summary table and continuum below illustrate the courts’ treatment 
of the factors since the Supreme Court’s decision in Darden. 
 
 276. See Vacca, supra note 8, at 232. 
 277. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324–27 (1992) (“[A] principle of 
statutory construction can endure just so many legislative revisitations, and Reid’s presumption that Congress 
means an agency law definition for ‘employee’ unless it clearly indicates otherwise signaled our abandonment 
of Silk’s emphasis on construing that term ‘in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.’” 
(quoting United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947))). 
 278. See Vacca, supra note 8, at 234. 
 279. Id. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3359683
2019] UNCERTAINTY IN EMPLOYEE STATUS ACROSS FEDERAL LAW 155 
Table 5  
ERISA 
(March 24, 1992 – February 19, 2018) 





Right to control 
manner and means 70% (37) 92% (34) 35% (13) 3% (1) 
Skill required 49% (26) 69% (18) 8% (2) 19% (5) 
Source of 
instrumentalities and 
tools 62% (33) 85% (28) 3% (1) 9% (3) 
Work location 49% (26) 62% (16) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Relationship duration 47% (25) 60% (15) 0% (0) 4% (1) 
Additional projects 43% (23) 100% (23) 9% (2) 4% (1) 
When and how long to 
work 58% (31) 87% (27) 0% (0) 10% (3) 
Payment method 85% (45) 87% (39) 7% (3) 0% (0) 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 42% (22) 73% (16) 0% (0) 9% (2) 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 42% (22) 45% (10) 5% (1) 9% (2) 
Hiring party in 
business 9% (5) 60% (3) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Employee benefits 68% (36) 83% (30) 6% (2) 6% (2) 
Tax treatment 74% (39) 85% (33) 8% (3) 3% (1) 







The most remarkable aspect of the factors under ERISA is the high degree of 
accuracy when isolating the right to control, payment method, benefits, and tax treatment 
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factors. The Court in Darden emphasized certainty, predictability, and what was within 
the hiring party’s knowledge.280 It is no surprise that tax treatment, benefits, and payment 
method are of high importance as they are easily determined. But the use of other factors 
seems to inject more uncertainty and unpredictability into the analysis. Like with the 
Copyright Act, perhaps it makes more sense to only look at a subset of the factors if 
certainty and predictability are of paramount concern. Also, as with the Copyright Act, 
the label the parties use to describe their relationship is of little importance in the analysis. 
D. Occupational Safety Health Act (OSHA) 
For OSHA, the summary table and continuum below illustrate the courts’ and the 
OSHRC’s treatments of the factors since the OSHRC’s decision in Vergona Crane. 
Because all but four of the cases were OSHRC decisions, agency and court cases were 
not separately analyzed. 
 
 280. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 326–27. 
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Table 6  
OSHA 
(July 22, 1992 – February 19, 2018) 





Right to control 
manner and means 80% (48) 96% (46) 69% (33) 0% (0) 
Skill required 42% (25) 72% (18) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Source of 
instrumentalities and 
tools 82% (49) 90% (44) 4% (2) 0% (0) 
Work location 53% (32) 78% (25) 3% (1) 6% (2) 
Relationship duration 48% (29) 72% (21) 0% (0) 3% (1) 
Additional projects 65% (39) 92% (36) 3% (1) 0% (0) 
When and how long to 
work 68% (41) 93% (38) 2% (1) 0% (0) 
Payment method 88% (53) 75% (40) 0% (0) 9% (5) 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 37% (22) 59% (13) 0% (0) 5% (1) 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 50% (30) 70% (21) 0% (0) 10% (3) 
Hiring party in 
business 27% (16) 63% (10) 0% (0) 13% (2) 
Employee benefits 53% (32) 53% (17) 0% (0) 19% (6) 
Tax treatment 55% (33) 42% (14) 0% (0) 15% (5) 







There are two interesting points to note about the OSHA results. First, although the 
right to control factor stands apart as the most important factor, it is not great in terms of 
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accurately predicting the outcomes. It only accurately predicts the outcome in 77% of 
the total cases. 
Second, OSHA tribunals are more hostile to the benefits and tax treatment factors 
than tribunals analyzing other legislation. The tribunals only address them about half the 
time (53% and 55%), they are only consistent about half the time (53% and 42%), and 
the discounting is quite high (19% and 15%). It is unclear why this is the case. These 
facts are easily determined and do not appear to have particular relevancy to worker 
safety. Further study is warranted. 
E. Antidiscrimination Statutes 
For the antidiscrimination acts, the summary tables and continua are below. For 
these results, the study combines all the antidiscrimination cases together and also 
separates out each act to see if there are differences between them. 
 
Table 7  
Combined Antidiscrimination 
(April 22, 2003 – February 19, 2018) 





Right to control 
manner and means 84% (153) 91% (139) 44% (67) 1% (2) 
Skill required 38% (70) 81% (57) 0% (0) 4% (3) 
Source of 
instrumentalities and 
tools 56% (102) 67% (68) 3% (3) 4% (4) 
Work location 58% (106) 58% (62) 1% (1) 5% (5) 
Relationship duration 38% (69) 52% (36) 0% (0) 6% (4) 
Additional projects 32% (59) 90% (53) 2% (1) 3% (2) 
When and how long to 
work 53% (97) 86% (83) 6% (6) 1% (1) 
Payment method 80% (146) 86% (125) 4% (6) 0% (0) 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 27% (49) 78% (38) 4% (2) 6% (3) 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 27% (50) 52% (26) 2% (1) 4% (2) 
Hiring party in 
business 10% (18) 39% (7) 0% (0) 22% (4) 
Employee benefits 73% (134) 84% (113) 6% (8) 1% (1) 
Tax treatment 64% (118) 86% (102) 8% (9) 2% (2) 
Label 64% (118) 89% (105) 8% (9) 2% (2) 
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Table 8  
Title VII 
(April 22, 2003 – February 19, 2018) 





Right to control 
manner and means 84% (102) 89% (91) 40% (41) 0% (0) 
Skill required 40% (48) 79% (38) 0% (0) 2% (1) 
Source of 
instrumentalities and 
tools 55% (66) 68% (45) 2% (1) 2% (1) 
Work location 57% (69) 62% (43) 0% (0) 1% (1) 
Relationship duration 40% (48) 54% (26) 0% (0) 2% (1) 
Additional projects 34% (41) 93% (38) 2% (1) 0% (0) 
When and how long to 
work 50% (61) 82% (50) 3% (2) 0% (0) 
Payment method 81% (98) 85% (83) 5% (5) 0% (0) 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 24% (29) 79% (23) 0% (0) 3% (1) 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 29% (35) 51% (18) 0% (0) 3% (1) 
Hiring party in 
business 9% (11) 55% (6) 0% (0) 18% (2) 
Employee benefits 72% (87) 85% (74) 5% (4) 0% (0) 
Tax treatment 64% (77) 86% (66) 6% (5) 0% (0) 
Label 63% (76) 88% (67) 8% (6) 1% (1) 
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(April 22, 2003 – February 19, 2018) 





Right to control 
manner and means 74% (25) 88% (22) 44% (11) 8% (2) 
Skill required 32% (11) 91% (10) 0% (0) 18% (2) 
Source of 
instrumentalities and 
tools 56% (19) 63% (12) 0% (0) 11% (2) 
Work location 59% (20) 50% (10) 0% (0) 10% (2) 
Relationship duration 32% (11) 55% (6) 0% (0) 18% (2) 
Additional projects 18% (6) 100% (6) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
When and how long to 
work 53% (18) 83% (15) 11% (2) 6% (1) 
Payment method 76% (26) 92% (24) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 26% (9) 67% (6) 11% (1) 22% (2) 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 21% (7) 57% (4) 0% (0) 14% (1) 
Hiring party in 
business 6% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 100% (2) 
Employee benefits 76% (26) 77% (20) 12% (3) 4% (1) 
Tax treatment 71% (24) 88% (21) 13% (3) 4% (1) 
Label 71% (24) 92% (22) 13% (3) 4% (1) 
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Table 10  
ADEA 
(April 22, 2003 – February 19, 2018) 





Right to control 
manner and means 88% (38) 97% (37) 50% (19) 3% (1) 
Skill required 42% (18) 83% (15) 0% (0) 6% (1) 
Source of 
instrumentalities and 
tools 63% (27) 67% (18) 7% (2) 11% (3) 
Work location 65% (28) 61% (17) 4% (1) 11% (3) 
Relationship duration 33% (14) 43% (6) 0% (0) 14% (2) 
Additional projects 40% (17) 82% (14) 0% (0) 12% (2) 
When and how long to 
work 63% (27) 93% (25) 7% (2) 4% (1) 
Payment method 81% (35) 89% (31) 3% (1) 0% (0) 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 42% (18) 83% (15) 6% (1) 6% (1) 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 30% (13) 38% (5) 8% (1) 8% (1) 
Hiring party in 
business 14% (6) 17% (1) 0% (0) 17% (1) 
Employee benefits 77% (33) 94% (31) 6% (2) 0% (0) 
Tax treatment 72% (31) 94% (29) 6% (2) 3% (1) 
Label 70% (30) 93% (28) 3% (1) 0% (0) 
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 Interestingly, there is less discounting in Title VII cases than in ADEA and ADA 
cases. Also of note is that for the hiring party’s ability to control when and how long to 
work, this factor seems to be of greater importance under the ADEA than in Title VII or 
the ADA. 
The ADA’s unfavorable treatment of hiring and paying assistants is notable when 
compared to Title VII and the ADEA because it is less consistent (67% versus 79% and 
83%) and discounted more (22% versus 3% and 6%). It is unclear why this is the case. 
The ADA also stands out because the courts discount the skill factor much more than 
they do under Title VII and the ADEA (18% versus 2% and 6%). One explanation could 
be that the ADA deals with disabilities, which may implicate the skills of the hired 
parties. If that explanation is correct, then this looks a lot like purposivism, which the 
Supreme Court has rejected.281 Further investigation is warranted. 
Finally, and perhaps most intriguing, is that the label the parties use to refer to their 
relationship is of relatively high importance in the antidiscrimination legislation when 
compared to other areas, such as the Copyright Act and ERISA. In a pre-Wells Title VII 
case, the Second Circuit discussed whether its decision in Aymes v. Bonelli,282 which 
emphasized certain factors in the context of the Copyright Act’s work-made-for-hire 
doctrine,283 should apply to Title VII cases.284 In rejecting Aymes for application to Title 
VII, the court explained that because copyright law was concerned with ownership of 
intellectual property, it made sense for the hiring and hired parties to be able to negotiate 
over these economic rights.285 But the court rejected such an approach when the right at 
 
 281. See, e.g., Darden, 503 U.S. at 324–27; see also Vacca, supra note 8, at 251. 
 282. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 283. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 860–61. 
 284. Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc., 237 F.3d 111, 115–17 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 285. Id. at 116 (“We interpret Aymes as standing for the proposition that a worker and a firm can enter 
into a contract that explicitly delineates who holds intellectual property rights to worker-created items, . . . and 
concomitantly a worker and a firm may by contract arrange the incidents of their particular                  
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issue was “the right to be treated in a non-discriminatory manner.”286 These types of 
rights, the court explained, are “‘public law’ rights . . . vested in workers as a class by 
Congress, and they are not subject to waiver or sale by individuals.”287 The concern the 
court had was that hiring parties would be able to devise compensation schemes whereby 
they would be able to effectively “opt out of the anti-discrimination laws.”288 
The Second Circuit’s reasoning makes sense. But the importance placed on the label 
factor in the antidiscrimination context in comparison to the economic rights areas of the 
Copyright Act and ERISA is entirely backwards. If the parties agree that they have an 
employee-employer relationship, then this may be more understandable if they are 
essentially bargaining over who owns a copyright or whether the hired party is eligible 
for particular retirement benefits. But if the right is one that cannot be bargained away, 
then it seems even more objectionable to permit the hiring party to simply write 
themselves out of the antidiscrimination statutes by labeling themselves as entering into 
an independent contractor arrangement. Although the courts in Copyright Act and 
ERISA cases may be correct in assigning the label factor little importance, it should 
follow that courts in antidiscrimination cases should be at least equally as hostile to this 
factor. These results show they are not. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Having presented the results and noted the interesting aspects within each set of 
legislation, first, this Discussion takes a big-picture view of the results and continua to 
determine what this tells us about the common law test across legislation.289 Then, this 
Discussion considers implications of these results for determining employee status in 
general and realizing the purposes of the laws.290 
A. Cross-Legislation Comparisons 
Looking at factors having a fairly consistent status across legislation, we 
immediately see that the hiring party being in business is the least important factor. What 
makes this remarkable is that when the American Law Institute published the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, this was the only factor added to the original list of 
factors from the Restatement (First) of Agency.291 It seems peculiar that the only factor 
the American Law Institute added is the one that is unimportant under every piece of 
legislation using this test. 
Next, except for the Copyright Act and courts applying the NLRA, the right to 
control factor is the most important across the board. Even for courts applying the NLRA, 
this is a fairly strong factor. Given that this factor mostly duplicates the ultimate question 
 
relationship—whether benefits will be provided, how workers will be treated for tax purposes, etc.—in a way 
that substantially determines who holds the intellectual property rights to worker-created items.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 117. 
 289. See infra Part IV.A. 
 290. See infra Part IV.B. 
 291. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
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being addressed, it is no surprise that it plays such a prominent role.292 But as 
commentators have previously noted, the other factors in the test are all ways of 
evidencing the hiring party’s control.293 Nonetheless, in their analyses, tribunals try to 
distinguish between control over the details of the work and control over the results.294 
This has been an elusive task.295 As one employment law scholar described, tribunals 
appear to have arbitrarily drawn the line between control over the details of the work and 
the result.296 
Even if the right to control factor were more definite, we can certainly question 
whether this factor is meaningful in distinguishing between employees and independent 
contractors. A lack of supervision or instructions could be attributable to the hired party’s 
independence, but it could also be due to the hiring party’s earned trust in the hired party 
based on past performance.297 Or it could be attributable to the type of work. A worker 
hired to do sales may not be sufficiently supervised in the performance of customer visits 
because of the offsite nature of the work.298 Does this lack of supervision tip in favor of 
independent contractor status? To a large extent, the distinction between supervising 
details and results necessarily depends on how the result is framed: broadly defined 
results tend to lead to more supervision whereas narrowly defined results tend to lead to 
less supervision.299 So although the right to control factor appears to be important, its 
flexible and ill-defined nature inhibits its effectiveness. 
Turning to a few other factors having a fairly consistent status across legislation, 
location of the work tends to float near the middle of the continua. Although in theory a 
hiring party whose worker performs on the hiring party’s physical location exercises 
more control than a worker who does not,300 this factor does not seem to carry 
overwhelming weight. It would be no surprise if the rise of telecommuting over the last 
decade or two has made this factor less important and will continue to do so in the 
future.301 
The duration factor is steadily at the bottom of the continua. This is unsurprising. 
Although it appears to be a simple and objective factor, it is not clear that it should be a 
good proxy for distinguishing between employees and independent contractors.302 Some 
types of tasks are long-term projects, which does not necessarily mean the hired party is 
an employee.303 Similarly, it is not hard to imagine a hired party that is otherwise an 
employee serving only temporarily.304 
 
 292. See Carlson, supra note 15, at 338–39; Vacca, supra note 8, at 222–23 n.256. 
 293. Carlson, supra note 15, at 339. 
 294. Id. 
 295. See id. at 339–40. 
 296. Id. at 340. 
 297. Id. at 340–41. 
 298. Id. at 341. 
 299. Id. at 339–40. 
 300. Id. at 347. 
 301. Id. at 347–48. 
 302. Id. at 344–45. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 345. 
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Another consistent factor is payment method. This factor has been described as 
being “nearly as old as the control test itself.”305 In his seminal work on employees and 
independent contractors, Richard Carlson concluded, “In the modern world, however, 
the method of compensation is rarely important in distinguishing employees from 
independent contractors.”306 The results of this study suggest otherwise. Payment 
method was near the top of all the continua. Perhaps the ease and objective nature of 
examining payroll records has made this factor stand out as important. 
Finally, the work being part of the regular business of the hiring party is frequently 
near the bottom of the continua. This factor is justified under the belief that an 
independent contractor operates “a business that functions as a separate business rather 
than as a cog in the [hiring party’s] machine.”307 Although this factor may have made 
sense during and in the aftermath of the industrial revolution, its usefulness to modern 
business is suspect.308 Today, important functions of a business are frequently contracted 
out making it difficult to determine what is and is not a regular part of the business.309 
The above-described factors maintain a fairly consistent status across legislation. 
The usefulness of some is questionable. The next few factors are scattered across the 
continua. 
Employee benefits and tax treatment factors are always closely associated with each 
other310 but are scattered across the continua. For example, for the NLRA, these factors 
are in the middle of the continua. For the Copyright Act, ERISA, and antidiscrimination 
cases, they are at or near the top. For OSHA, they are near the bottom. It is unclear why 
there is so much variation across legislation. This is particularly confusing given that 
these two factors are the two most objective of the group and easily analyzed by tribunals. 
The other scattered factor is how the parties label their relationship or designate 
themselves. This is near the bottom of the continua for the NLRB, the Copyright Act, 
and ERISA. It is in the middle for OSHA and courts addressing the NLRA. But it is near 
the top for the antidiscrimination statutes. As described above, the importance of the 
label for antidiscrimination purposes, in contrast with the Copyright Act and ERISA, 
seems completely backwards.311 What is unclear is why there is such variation across 
legislation. Further study is warranted. 
For the rest of the factors, there seems to be fair consistency across the continua. 
For control over when and how long to work, this factor is mostly in the middle and 
occasionally near the top across the continua. Despite some consistency, it is easy to 
think of many examples where the hiring party’s control over the timing and number of 
hours worked does not reflect the hired party’s independence.312 For example, full-time 
university professors have much discretion over their work schedule, but there is little 
 
 305. Id. at 346. 
 306. Id. at 347. 
 307. Id. at 348. 
 308. See id. 
 309. Id. at 348–49. 
 310. See supra Figures 1–10 showing that employee benefits and tax treatment are always in the same 
group (except for combined antidiscrimination cases). 
 311. See supra Part III.E. 
 312. See Carlson, supra note 15, at 346. 
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doubt they are employees of their university.313 Likewise, an independent security guard 
would have their schedule set by the hiring party; she could not exercise discretion and 
vary when she worked.314 
The ability to hire and pay for assistants has fair consistency. As Carlson explains, 
this factor should serve as “the most likely sign that a worker is not an employee” because 
the hired party “is in fact an employer.”315 One who hires another to do part of the work 
she was hired to do looks more independent than one who cannot.316 Likewise, the hiring 
party seems to exercise less control over the work being done and the hired party bears 
the risks of labor costs.317 It has been suggested that this factor may be the best proof of 
independence and that some courts have moved in this direction.318 But the results of this 
study indicate otherwise. This factor is mostly near the bottom of the continua except for 
the NLRB, where it sits in the middle. Perhaps it should be more important in the 
analysis, but it currently is not. 
The skill factor is mostly in the middle or near the bottom of the continua, except 
for the Copyright Act, where it is near the top. The importance of this factor seems to 
have diminished over the long history of distinguishing between employees and 
independent contractors because of changes in the corporate organization.319 As firms 
have necessarily expanded to hire large numbers of highly skilled professionals, the 
antiquated notion that a professional could not be an employee has lost salience.320 
Finally, it has been noted that supplying the tools and instrumentalities might be of 
little importance today as more professions depend on intellectual capital than physical 
tools.321 This study indicates that this factor is not as weak as previously thought. The 
continua show that this factor sits near the top or middle. To be sure, there is some range 
across the continua, but it appears to be a fairly important factor for many areas (e.g., 
NLRA, Copyright Act, and OSHA). 
Below, Table 11 illustrates how consistent the factors are across legislation. In sum, 
cross-legislation consistency is not absolutely disastrous, but this breakdown shows that 
the current approach is not a model of certainty and predictability by any means. 
 
 
 313. Id. 
 314. See id. 
 315. Id. at 352. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. See id. at 353. 
 319. Id. at 349–50. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 351. 
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B. New Approaches to Employee Determinations 
The Supreme Court promoted certainty and predictability as the key goals 
underlying adoption of the common law multifactor test. The charts, continua, and 
discussion above beg the question of whether certainty and predictability are being 
achieved. Given the number of factors, how differently they are treated across legislation, 
and how poorly many of them perform at accurately predicting the outcomes, the answer 
is undoubtedly no. 
What can be done in light of the disarray from this test? One option could be to use 
a subset of the factors rather than the dozen or so currently in use. The difficulty is 
identifying those that would best do the job given the scattered importance described 
above. Matthew Bodie argued that based on the theory of the firm literature, a definition 
of employee based on participation, rather than control, is a better fit for the modern 
economy.322 He suggested that the participation standard uses many of the Restatement 
factors, but the ones of most importance are (1) whether the hired party is engaged in a 
distinct occupation or business, (2) who supplies the instrumentalities and tools, 
(3) duration, (4) whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party, 
(5) whether the parties believe they are creating an employment relationship (i.e., label), 
and (6) whether the hiring party is in business.323 
Although he was not suggesting that the participation approach was being used, the 
results of this study point to a wide discrepancy between his proposed important factors 
and how important they are today. Tribunals would need to completely reverse course 
on several factors, such as whether the hiring party is in business, whether the work is 
 
 322. Bodie, supra note 15, at 665–66, 705–06. 
 323. Id. at 707. 
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part of the regular business, and duration of the relationship, all of which are at or near 
the bottom across the continua. Although the focus would be narrowed, such an approach 
would be a major shift from the current emphases. 
Another approach to narrowing the factors considered is to use the continua in this 
study to establish hierarchies. Tribunals could begin by looking only at the factors in the 
most important group or two. If these factors mostly pointed towards a certain outcome, 
then the tribunal could stop. But if the factors were split, then the tribunal would move 
to the factors in the next lower group or two to serve as a tiebreaker. Although not perfect, 
such a system might provide more certainty and predictability by narrowing the focus in 
the analysis. 
A second option for handling the confusion over the current test could be adopting 
a purposive approach to interpreting the term “employee.” The Restatement, which 
serves as the basis for the common law test, expressly recommended such an approach.324 
As described earlier, there may be instances of this occurring already.325 Under current 
law, a worker filing a claim for copyright infringement might be classified as an 
employee under the work-made-for-hire doctrine. That same worker might then file a 
separate claim for discrimination under Title VII and be deemed an independent 
contractor. Even though the same worker does the same job and the court applies the 
same test, the results could differ. The different treatment of the factors makes this a 
possibility. Such a result does not further certainty and predictability and seems peculiar 
or even arbitrary without a purposive approach. 
Taking a purposive approach would be one way of logically distinguishing different 
outcomes. There may be less certainty and predictability across legislation, but it could 
result in more consistency and predictability within a particular body of law if specific 
animating principles driving that law were available for tribunals to use. But this 
approach is unlikely to take hold. It would fly in the face of approximately seventy years 
of Congressional and Supreme Court authority to the contrary.326 
A third option is to reduce or eliminate the need to distinguish between employees 
and independent contractors. Put succinctly, “[e]mployee status matters mainly because 
our employment laws make it matter.”327 However, this would not be an easy fix to the 
problems of inconsistency and unpredictability plaguing agencies, courts, companies, 
and individuals. Legislative action would be required and would be difficult to 
accomplish. 
But such an approach may make the most sense as a matter of both achieving the 
underlying policy goals of the legislation and enhancing certainty and predictability. For 
example, if Title VII was designed to rid the U.S. of discrimination in the workplace,328 
why do we permit hiring parties to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, age, and disability when it comes to independent contractors? Why is 
 
 324. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 325. See supra Part III.B for a description of skill as important under copyright law and Part III.E for a 
discussion of skill as less important under the ADA.  
 326. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text discussing the rejection of purposivism in 1968 with 
the Supreme Court’s holding in NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America. 
 327. Carlson, supra note 15, at 368. 
 328. Davidson, supra note 11, at 203. 
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this okay against some people and not others? Similarly, why is a hiring party with 
fourteen employees allowed to discriminate with impunity, but one with fifteen may not? 
Why do we require hiring parties with employees to provide safe workplaces, but an 
identical hiring party with independent contractors can provide unsafe workplaces 
without government intervention? Is not everyone’s safety equally important? 
Depending on what policy objective is sought, there might very well be better methods 
to further those policy goals than by distinguishing between employees and independent 
contractors. 
For some acts, Congress did not give much thought to whether employee status was 
the best way to determine the law’s applicability.329 This appears to be what happened 
with respect to ERISA.330 The problem and risk presented by employee benefit      
plans—losing anticipated retirement benefits and not receiving adequate 
disclosures331—are identical to those faced by independent contractors.332 Why give 
some workers who are promised these benefits the protection of federal law but deny 
those same benefits to other workers who are promised the same benefits? 
Employee status need not be the defining characteristic. In fact, ERISA protection 
already extends not just to employees but also employees’ beneficiaries.333 Amending 
ERISA to cover all workers who are provided retirement benefit packages would expand 
the scope of coverage but would not significantly increase the burden on employers.334 
In fact, due to ERISA’s preemption provisions, having a single, uniform law might 
reduce the costs of compliance to hiring parties.335 With such a change, the difficulties 
of distinguishing between employees and independent contractors that are imposed on 
courts, litigants, and parties negotiating benefits packages would vanish. 
For the antidiscrimination statutes, there is nothing in the legislative history 
indicating why Congress chose to limit protection to employees rather than extend it to 
independent contractors.336 Thus, it is not clear why focusing on employee status is a 
proper means of determining who can and cannot be lawfully discriminated against. 
Instead of drawing a distinction with no known purpose, perhaps a better solution to 
stopping discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, 
disability, and age would be, to paraphrase Chief Justice Roberts, to stop discriminating 
entirely on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, and age.337 
 
 329. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 15, at 359. 
 330. See id. (“Congress’s choice of an employee basis for ERISA coverage appears to be a product of 
habit rather than necessity.”). 
 331. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)–(b) (2018). 
 332. See Carlson, supra note 15, at 359. 
 333. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (defining “participant” as “any employee or former employee of an 
employer . . . who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan 
which covers employees of such employer . . . or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such 
benefit”). 
 334. Carlson, supra note 15, at 359–60. 
 335. Cf. id. at 360 (arguing that ERISA preempts other types of “claims that might be even more 
burdensome”). 
 336. See Davidson, supra note 11, at 205–06. 
 337. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747–48 (2007). 
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In addition to affecting who can be a proper plaintiff, employee status impacts who 
can be a proper defendant. Title VII and the ADA only apply to employers with fifteen 
or more employees.338 The ADEA only applies to employers with twenty or more 
employees.339 Unlike the provisions limiting potential plaintiffs, the purpose of setting 
these thresholds for a proper defendant is apparent from the legislative history.340 
Congress did not want to burden small businesses.341 
In some cases, it is not clear what the burden would be. For example, if a hiring 
party with ten employees fires a worker on the basis of race or gender, what burden are 
they relieved of other than the burden of not being discriminatory? If this is all that can 
be pointed to, then such a burden is not one that should be given any weight in balancing 
policy goals. 
But for other cases, the burden is more apparent. For example, in a disability 
discrimination case, the hiring party might be required to make reasonable 
accommodations for the hired party.342 Although the hiring party need not undergo undue 
hardship in making the reasonable accommodation,343 such accommodations may cost 
money (e.g., installing ramps for wheelchair access), which is an additional burden on 
the hiring party. 
But is the number of employees the best proxy for measuring whether the hiring 
party can or should bear this burden? If this burden is a real concern, why not use annual 
revenue or profit as a better guide?344 A company with ten employees earning $10 million 
per year in profit is likely more able to absorb the burden of compliance than a company 
with twenty-five employees that is financially struggling. Besides being a better proxy 
for the ability to handle this burden, distinguishing between proper defendants on a profit 
basis is presumably easier than counting employees under the common law’s multifactor 
right to control test. 
Although legislative fixes would be an ideal way to better achieve the underlying 
goals of the legislation and reduce the uncertainty surrounding employee status, this is 
unlikely to occur given Congressional gridlock.345 A purposive approach could justify 
the different treatment and inconsistent emphasis but is also unlikely given the history of 
the term “employee” in the statutes. If consistency and predictability are important 
concerns, then perhaps the most realistic approach is to create hierarchies based on the 
continua to narrow the factors used under the common law test. Because the Supreme 
Court has not given any guidance as to which factors are the most important, such an 
approach could be adopted by lower courts without running afoul of precedent.346 
 
 338. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 12111(5) (2018). 
 339. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2018). 
 340. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 229 (5th abr. ed. 2015).  
 341. Id. 
 342. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5). 
 343. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 340, at 323. 
 344. See Carlson, supra note 15, at 366 (arguing that gross revenue is a better predictor of size and 
capacity than the number of people a business employs). 
 345. See Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2014). 
 346. In the event the Supreme Court rejected such an approach and mandated analyzing each factor, then 
a hierarchy approach would be inappropriate. Nonetheless, the continua in this Article would still be of value in 
helping attorneys and parties predict how courts might rule on the facts of their case. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3359683
2019] UNCERTAINTY IN EMPLOYEE STATUS ACROSS FEDERAL LAW 171 
CONCLUSION 
Although tribunals use an identical multifactor test to interpret the term “employee” 
across many federal statutes, until now, there has been no study to measure which factors 
are the most and least important under each act and whether the factors are treated 
consistently across legislation. And despite the Supreme Court’s insistence that this test 
is justified on the grounds of furthering certainty and predictability, this study illustrates 
that inconsistency and unpredictability abound, not only within a particular act, but also 
across legislation. Although weighting the factors differently depending on the purpose 
of the legislation could make sense if writing on a blank slate, the Supreme Court’s 
repeated rejection of a purposive approach to understanding the term “employee” does 
not justify such an interpretation. 
In light of these findings, what can be done? As discussed, relying on employee 
status to determine the applicability of legislation can be an imprecise proxy for 
achieving the goals of the statutes. Better and easier-to-apply measures can be used 
instead, but this would require Congressional action, which is unlikely to occur. Rather 
than relying on Congress, an alternative approach is to use the continua in this study to 
establish hierarchies of factors. Although inconsistencies would remain across 
legislation, certainty and predictability within legislation would likely improve. 
Finally, the results of this study invite further research into how tribunals treat the 
factors. A closer examination of why certain factors are more or less important within the 
statutes is warranted. In addition, examining whether there is a geographic difference and 
whether and why agencies and courts treat the factors differently could provide 
interesting insights. Finally, exploring alternative approaches to distinguishing between 
employees and independent contractors, both at the state and federal level, and measuring 
their certainty and predictability could provide a nice comparison in evaluating the 
effectiveness of the tests. 
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APPENDIX A 











Employee or independent 
contractor status N/A 100% 1.000 
Right to control 
Direction 89% 0.795 
Weight 89% 0.778 
Skill required 
Direction 96% 0.929 
Weight 100% undefined 
Source of instrumentalities/tools 
Direction 92% 0.874 
Weight 100% undefined 
Location of the work 
Direction 89% 0.841 
Weight 98% -0.011 
Duration of the relationship 
Direction 84% 0.751 
Weight 93% -0.027 
Right to assign additional projects 
Direction 96% 0.924 
Weight 100% undefined 
Discretion over when and how long 
to work 
Direction 89% 0.791 
Weight 96% 0.310 
Method of payment 
Direction 91% 0.809 
Weight 93% -0.022 
Hiring and paying assistants 
Direction 87% 0.788 
Weight 100% undefined 
Part of regular business 
Direction 91% 0.778 
Weight 100% undefined 
In business 
Direction 100% 1.000 
Weight 100% undefined 
Benefits 
Direction 93% 0.843 
Weight 96% 0.726 
Tax treatment 
Direction 91% 0.713 
Weight 96% 0.726 
Label 
Direction 89% 0.801 
Weight 91% 0.645 
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APPENDIX B 
Codebook 
When coding the cases, we care about what the tribunal says in the analysis, not 
what we think the correct analysis should be. 
 
Employee or Independent Contractor: This field tracks the tribunal’s ultimate decision 
on whether the hired party was an employee or independent contractor. If the tribunal 
states that the hired party was an employee, then enter 1. Otherwise, enter 0. 
Note: If for some reason the tribunal does not make this determination, then the 
case was erroneously included. 
Note: For cases involving determining whether a hired party is an employee of one 
party or another, be sure to keep an eye on which hiring party is being referred to 
in the analysis. For example, the tribunal may say the hired party is an employee 
of Company A, but in its analysis the tribunal is really focused on showing the 
hired party is really an independent contractor of Company B. The conclusion 
would be independent contractor (0), not employee (1) because the focus of the 
analysis is on the relationship with Company B. 
 
Direction of each factor: These fields list the thirteen factors from Reid, plus a factor 
titled “Agreement Label,” as well as “Other Factors” and “Other Factors2.” For each 
factor, there are four possible codes: 
• 0 if the tribunal does not address the factor. 
• 1 if the tribunal states that the factor favors employee status. 
• 2 if the tribunal states that the factor favors independent contractor status. 
• 3 if the tribunal addresses the factor, but it cannot be determined from the 
tribunal’s statements whether this factor favors employee or independent 
contractor status. Also, use this when the tribunal suggests the factor is neutral 
or irrelevant (i.e., it neither favors employee or independent contractor status). 
Note: If the tribunal simply lists the factors, but does not apply them, then enter 0. 
With these fields, we are concerned about actual application, not just a statement 
of the law. Similarly, we don’t care about the parties’ arguments; we care about 
how the tribunal treats the factors. 
Note: If the tribunal says the direction of a factor could be either neutral (or a 
similar statement, such as “in equipoise”) or points towards employee or 
independent contractor, but doesn’t definitively say, then code it as either a 1 or 
2—depending on which direction the tribunal indicates the factor points. Do not 
code it as a 3. Treat the weight as you normally would (i.e., don’t necessarily 
discount it just because the direction could be neutral). 
 
Explanation of the Factors: Below is a description of the typical factors addressed 
under the common law test. In the event the tribunal says it is analyzing a particular 
factor, but seems to analyze it differently than what is described below, use the tribunal’s 
classification. Use the descriptions below in the absence of a clear indication from the 
tribunal about what factor(s) it is applying. 
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(0) hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product 
is accomplished – Sometimes tribunals treat this as a factor, but sometimes they treat it 
as the ultimate question to be answered (and use the other factors below to answer that 
question). If the tribunal does not treat it as a factor, then you should not either. Look for 
language calling right to control a factor. This indicates it is being treated as one. If the 
tribunal only speaks of right to control as being the general standard to apply, then it 
should be coded as a 0 because it is not addressed as a factor. In such a scenario, the 
weight should also be a 0. But if listed as a factor and given weight or discounted, it is 
okay to use those weight codes. If the tribunal has a section or paragraph in the opinion, 
separate from the other factors, focusing solely on the right to control, then this suggests 
it is treating it as a factor. 
Language suggesting employee status includes, but is not limited to, statements 
about the hiring party controlling how the job is done or supervising the hired party. 
Language suggesting independent contractor status includes, but is not limited to, 
statements about the hired party having discretion or freedom in how to work, or the 
hiring party having a lack of supervision over the hired party. 
(1) Skill required – Focused on whether the work the hired party is hired to do 
involves skilled work (e.g., surgeon) or unskilled work (e.g., taxi driver). 
(2) Source of the instrumentalities and tools – Looking at ownership of the 
instrumentalities or tools that are used in the work. If the hired party owns them, then 
this indicates independent contractor status. If the hiring party owns them, this indicates 
employee status. 
(3) Location of the work – Looks at where the work takes place. Is it done on the 
hiring party’s premises or where the hiring party directs (indicating employee status)? 
Or is it done elsewhere, such as the hired party’s home (indicating independent 
contractor)? A clue to independent contractor status is that the hired party has a choice 
of where to work. 
(4) Duration of the relationship between the parties – This is the length of time 
the parties work together. It is not how many hours per day, week, or month, which goes 
to factor #6. 
(5) Whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the 
hired party – If the hiring party can demand that the hired party perform different tasks, 
responsibilities, or jobs, then this indicates employee status. If not, then this indicates 
independent contractor status. Unless the tribunal indicates otherwise, this factor does 
not include being able to work for others (which should be listed under “Other Factor” 
or “Other Factor2”). 
(6) Extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work – 
This factor is focused on whether the hiring party can tell the hired party what time work 
begins and ends. If the hiring party tells the hired party to be at work at 8:00 AM and to 
work until 5:00 PM, then this indicates employee status. In contrast, if the hired party 
has discretion over when to work (i.e., can come and go as s/he chooses as long as the 
work is done), then this points towards independent contractor status. Working a lot of 
hours is not necessarily indicative—it is about how much choice there is in working the 
hours. 
(7) Method of payment – This includes anything relating to payment to the hired 
party, but not tax and benefits, which are dealt with as separate factors. Keeping all the 
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income from a job (minus the costs of performing) usually indicates independent 
contractor status. Likewise, being paid a salary usually suggests employee status. Being 
paid on a per project basis typically indicates independent contractor status. 
(8) Hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants – This includes hiring 
substitutes or replacements for the hired party. If the hired party can hire assistants or 
substitutes, then this suggests independent contractor status. If not, then it points towards 
employee status. 
(9) Whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party – If the 
work is a core or regular part of the hiring party’s business, then this indicates employee 
status. If the work is incidental to the hiring party’s business, then this indicates 
independent contractor status. 
(10) Whether the hiring party is in business. 
(11) The provision of employee benefits – If the hired party provides benefits 
(e.g., health insurance, dental insurance, retirement contributions or pensions, disability 
insurance), then this suggests employee status. If no benefits are provided, then this 
suggests independent contractor status. 
(12) The tax treatment of the hired party – If the hiring party pays taxes on behalf 
of the hired party (e.g., income, FICA, unemployment), then this indicates employee 
status. Issuing a W2 tax form indicates employee status. If taxes are not withheld and a 
1099 tax form is used, then this indicates independent contractor status. 
(13) Label – We are looking at how the parties labeled the hired party. For example, 
is there a contract that lists the hired party as “contractor” or “employee?” Or does the 
hired party or hiring party hold the hired party out as an employee or independent 
contractor? Sometimes the tribunal will talk about this in terms of intent. Wearing the 
hiring party’s uniform or company logo is not included here. We are looking at how the 
parties referred to the hired party. Unless the tribunal refers to it separately from the tax 
status factor, do not include tax documents as part of the label analysis. 
(14) Other Factors and Other Factors2 – These are factors the tribunal 
considered that are not included in the other listed factors. If additional factors are listed, 
code them the same way as the other factors. Make sure to describe the factors as 
described below. 
 
Description of other factors: If additional factors are listed, make sure to add a short 
description of the other factors in the fields marked “Description of Other Factors” and 
“Description of Other Factors2.” If there are more than two additional factors, then add 
them to the “Notes” field at the end of the row. Before adding the factor to these fields, 
make sure that the application is not really just one of the other listed factors with a 
slightly different name. 
 
Analogizing to other cases: If the tribunal discusses an analysis in another case and 
analogizes to the case you are coding, then treat the discussed factor(s) the same as the 
older case unless the tribunal indicates otherwise. 
 
Weighting of each factor: These fields capture whether the tribunal weighted the factor 
at issue. For each of these fields there are three possible codes: 
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• 0 if the tribunal did not expressly weight the factor 
• 1 if the tribunal expressly weighted the factor as important 
• 2 if the tribunal expressly discounted the importance of the factor 
Note: Coding these fields should be based on some express statement by the tribunal 
about particular factors being more or less important. This is to be distinguished 
from scenarios where there are some factors that point toward employee status and 
others that point toward independent contractor status, but the tribunal makes a 
determination about the hired party’s ultimate status. In such a situation, the factors 
that are inconsistent with the ultimate result are not necessarily discounted. Nor are 
the factors that are consistent with the ultimate result necessarily weighted as 
important. What we are looking for is some affirmative statement by the tribunal 
(1) that, in the abstract, the factor generally is entitled to additional weights or 
should be generally discounted; or (2) during the application of the factor to the facts 
of the particular case that the factor weighs heavily or is of relative unimportance in 
the analysis. 
Note: Relevant language for express weighting includes, but is not limited 
to: “highly suggestive,” “creates a strong inference,” “considered significant,” 
“strong indicator,” “high importance,” “great weight,” “additional weight,” and 
“most important.” 
Note: Relevant language for discounting includes, but is not limited to: “carries little 
weight,” “discount its important,” “has only minimal impact,” “has little influence,” 
and “discount its effect.” 
 
Weights of particular case factors re: importance: If the tribunal, in its analysis of the 
factors, mentions that some factors are more or less important than others and cites to a 
case for this proposition, then list the cases that are cited and provide the citation. 
Otherwise, leave this field blank. 
Note: For example, in the Copyright Act cases, courts will sometimes cite to Aymes 
v. Bonelli to say that (1) right to control, (2) skill required, (3) employee benefits, 
(4) tax treatment, and (5) the right to assign additional projects are the most 
important factors. 
 
Notes Field: Use this field to note anything of importance that makes the case unusual 
or that requires a closer look. 
 
Additional Thoughts to Keep in Mind as You Code the Cases: 
1) Do not rely on your determination of employee or independent contractor status 
that you may have noted during the screening phase of the project. Look at the issue 
anew. 
2) Keep an eye out to make sure the statute being interpreted is the correct one. For 
example, if you are reviewing an ERISA case, make sure that the tribunal’s application 
of the common law multifactor test is really for a dispute over the ERISA statute, and 
not, say, over an IRS regulation dispute that refers to the common law test. 
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3) If you see a red flag in Westlaw indicating negative treatment of the case, then 
check to see if a higher authority reversed your case on the basis of the 
employee/independent contractor issue. 
4) If you find a case that uses a subset of factors for distinguishing employees from 
employers (e.g., shareholders, partners, directors) or for the joint employer scenario, then 
do not include this case. This is mostly likely to be seen in the Title VII, ADA, and 
ADEA cases. 
5) If a case has two (or more) separate applications to different people (or sets of 
people), then make two (or more) entries. That is, insert a row (or rows) below the case 
and code each analysis separately. 
6) Be sure to check the footnotes. Sometimes additional analysis occurs there. 
7) If the tribunal does not make a determination about one or more factors, but 
instead expressly assumes certain factors favor an outcome, code them according to the 
assumption. For example, the tribunal says the parties dispute which direction factors X 
and Y point. It then says that even if it assumed X and Y point toward employee status, 
it would still find that the party was an independent contractor. You should code the X 
and Y fields with a 1 for independent contractor. 
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APPENDIX C 
Combined NLRA (Board and Court) Calculations  
 




Payment method 72% 
Right to control manner 
and means 67% 
Tax treatment 64% 
When and how long to 
work 63% 
Employee benefits 55% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 52% 
Label 46% 
Additional projects 45% 
Work location 38% 
Part of regular business 
of hiring party 30% 
Relationship duration 28% 
Skill required 23% 
Hiring party in 
business 3% 
 
Table 1.B – Consistency (%) 
Factor Consistency 
Hiring party in 
business 100% 
Right to control 
manner and means 94% 
Additional projects 84% 
Work location 80% 
Skill required 76% 
Part of regular business 
of hiring party 73% 
When and how long to 
work 72% 




Payment method 69% 
Relationship duration 63% 
Label 62% 
Employee benefits 59% 
Tax treatment 54% 
 
 




Right to control 
manner and means 16% 
Payment method 6% 
Part of regular business 
of hiring party 3% 
Label 3% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 3% 
Relationship duration 2% 
When and how long to 
work 2% 
Tax treatment 2% 
Additional projects 1% 
Employee benefits 1% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 1% 
Skill required 0% 
Work location 0% 








When and how long to 
work 6% 





Employee benefits 4% 
Relationship duration 4% 
Payment method 3% 
Additional projects 3% 
Part of regular business 
of hiring party 3% 
Work location 3% 
Skill required 2% 
Tax treatment 2% 
Right to control 
manner and means 1% 
Hiring party in 
business 0% 
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NLRA Board Calculations 
 




Right to control 
manner and means 73% 
Payment method 72% 
Tax treatment 64% 
When and how long 
to work 61% 
Employee benefits 56% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 53% 
Additional projects 44% 
Label 44% 
Work location 36% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 31% 
Relationship duration 26% 
Skill required 21% 
Hiring party in 
business 4% 
 
Table 2.B – Consistency (%) 
Factor Consistency 
Hiring party in 
business 100% 
Right to control 
manner and means 94% 
Work location 83% 
Additional projects 80% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 78% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 73% 
Skill required 71% 
When and how long 
to work 70% 
Payment method 69% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 68% 
Relationship duration 63% 
Label 61% 
Employee benefits 55% 
Tax treatment 51% 
 
 




Right to control 
manner and means 13% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 4% 
Payment method 3% 
Label 3% 
Relationship duration 2% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 2% 
When and how long 
to work 2% 
Additional projects 1% 
Employee benefits 1% 
Tax treatment 1% 
Skill required 0% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 0% 
Work location 0% 











When and how long 
to work 4% 
Employee benefits 4% 
Additional projects 3% 
Skill required 3% 
Payment method 2% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 2% 
Relationship duration 2% 
Tax treatment 2% 
Right to control 
manner and means 1% 
Work location 0% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 0% 
Hiring party in 
business 0% 
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NLRA Court Calculations 
 




Payment method 71% 
When and how long 
to work 69% 
Tax treatment 67% 
Employee benefits 53% 
Label 53% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 49% 
Additional projects 47% 
Right to control 
manner and means 44% 
Work location 44% 
Relationship duration 38% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 24% 
Skill required 24% 
Hiring party in 
business 0% 
 
Table 3.B – Consistency (%) 
Factor Consistency 
Additional projects 100% 
Right to control 
manner and means 95% 
Skill required 91% 




Work location 75% 
Employee benefits 67% 
Relationship duration 65% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 64% 
Payment method 63% 
Tax treatment 60% 
Label 58% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 55% 








Right to control 
manner and means 30% 
Payment method 16% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 5% 
Label 4% 
Tax treatment 3% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 3% 
When and how long 
to work 0% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 0% 
Relationship duration 0% 
Additional projects 0% 
Employee benefits 0% 
Work location 0% 
Skill required 0% 








Hiring and paying 
assistants 18% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 18% 
When and how long to 
work 13% 
Work location 10% 
Payment method 9% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 9% 
Tax treatment 7% 
Relationship duration 6% 
Additional projects 5% 
Employee benefits 4% 
Label 0% 
Right to control 
manner and means 0% 
Skill required 0% 
Hiring party in 
business undefined 
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Copyright Calculations 
 
Table 4.A – Frequency (%) 
Factor Frequency 
Payment method 86% 
Right to control 
manner and means 80% 
Tax treatment 80% 
Employee benefits 78% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 73% 
Work location 73% 
Additional projects 67% 
When and how long 
to work 67% 
Relationship duration 63% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 63% 
Skill required 55% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 37% 
Label 20% 
Hiring party in 
business 18% 
 
Table 4.B – Consistency (%) 
Factor Consistency 
Employee benefits 90% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 89% 
Skill required 86% 
Tax treatment 85% 
Additional projects 85% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 84% 
Payment method 84% 
When and how long to 
work 82% 
Relationship duration 81% 
Work location 76% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 74% 
Right to control 
manner and means 59% 
Label 50% 








Employee benefits 38% 
Skill required 36% 
Tax treatment 34% 
Additional projects 26% 
Right to control 
manner and means 17% 
Payment method 14% 
Label 10% 
Relationship duration 6% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 5% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 0% 
Work location 0% 
When and how long to 
work 0% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 0% 








Hiring party in 
business 33% 
Label 30% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 13% 
Right to control 
manner and means 12% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 11% 
Work location 11% 
Tax treatment 7% 
Relationship duration 6% 
When and how long 
to work 6% 
Employee benefits 5% 
Skill required 4% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 3% 
Additional projects 3% 
Payment method 2% 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3359683
182 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92 
ERISA Calculations 
 
Table 5.A – Frequency (%) 
Factor Frequency 
Payment method 85% 
Tax treatment 74% 
Right to control 
manner and means 70% 
Employee benefits 68% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 62% 
When and how long 
to work 58% 
Skill required 49% 
Work location 49% 
Relationship duration 47% 
Label 45% 
Additional projects 43% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 42% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 42% 
Hiring party in 
business 9% 
 
Table 5.B – Consistency (%) 
Factor Consistency 
Additional projects 100% 
Right to control 
manner and means 92% 
When and how long to 
work 87% 
Payment method 87% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 85% 
Tax treatment 85% 
Employee benefits 83% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 73% 
Skill required 69% 
Label 67% 
Work location 62% 
Relationship duration 60% 
Hiring party in 
business 60% 
Part of regular 








Right to control 
manner and means 35% 
Additional projects 9% 
Label 8% 
Tax treatment 8% 
Skill required 8% 
Payment method 7% 
Employee benefits 6% 
Part of regular 




Hiring and paying 
assistants 0% 
When and how long to 
work 0% 
Relationship duration 0% 
Work location 0% 








Skill required 19% 




Hiring and paying 
assistants 9% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 9% 
Employee benefits 6% 
Relationship duration 4% 
Additional projects 4% 
Label 4% 
Tax treatment 3% 
Right to control 
manner and means 3% 
Work location 0% 
Payment method 0% 
Hiring party in 
business 0% 
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OSHA Calculations 
 
Table 6.A – Frequency (%) 
Factor Frequency 
Payment method 88% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 82% 
Right to control 
manner and means 80% 
When and how long 
to work 68% 
Additional projects 65% 
Label 58% 
Tax treatment 55% 
Work location 53% 
Employee benefits 53% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 50% 
Relationship duration 48% 
Skill required 42% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 37% 
Hiring party in 
business 27% 
 
Table 6.B – Consistency (%) 
Factor Consistency 
Right to control 
manner and means 96% 
When and how long to 
work 93% 




Work location 78% 
Payment method 75% 
Skill required 72% 
Relationship duration 72% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 70% 
Hiring party in 
business 63% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 59% 
Employee benefits 53% 
Tax treatment 42% 
 
 




Right to control 
manner and means 69% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 4% 
Work location 3% 
Additional projects 3% 
When and how long to 
work 2% 
Relationship duration 0% 
Payment method 0% 
Skill required 0% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 0% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 0% 
Hiring party in 
business 0% 
Employee benefits 0% 








Employee benefits 19% 
Tax treatment 15% 
Hiring party in 
business 13% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 10% 
Payment method 9% 
Work location 6% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 5% 
Label 5% 
Relationship duration 3% 
Additional projects 0% 
When and how long 
to work 0% 
Right to control 
manner and means 0% 
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Combined Antidiscrimination Calculations 
 
Table 7.A – Frequency (%) 
Factor Frequency 
Right to control 
manner and means 84% 
Payment method 80% 
Employee benefits 73% 
Tax treatment 64% 
Label 64% 
Work location 58% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 56% 
When and how long to 
work 53% 
Skill required 38% 
Relationship duration 38% 
Additional projects 32% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 27% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 27% 
Hiring party in 
business 10% 
 
Table 7.B – Consistency (%) 
Factor Consistency 
Right to control 
manner and means 91% 
Additional projects 90% 
Label 89% 
Tax treatment 86% 
When and how long 
to work 86% 
Payment method 86% 
Employee benefits 84% 
Skill required 81% 




Work location 58% 
Relationship duration 52% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 52% 








Right to control 
manner and means 44% 
Tax treatment 8% 
Label 8% 
When and how long to 
work 6% 
Employee benefits 6% 
Payment method 4% 




Additional projects 2% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 2% 
Work location 1% 
Skill required 0% 
Relationship duration 0% 








Hiring party in 
business 22% 
Relationship duration 6% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 6% 
Work location 5% 
Skill required 4% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 4% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 4% 
Additional projects 3% 
Tax treatment 2% 
Label 2% 
When and how long to 
work 1% 
Employee benefits 1% 
Right to control 
manner and means 1% 
Payment method 0% 
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Title VII Calculations 
 
Table 8.A – Frequency (%) 
Factor Frequency 
Right to control 
manner and means 84% 
Payment method 81% 
Employee benefits 72% 
Tax treatment 64% 
Label 63% 
Work location 57% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 55% 
When and how long 
to work 50% 
Relationship duration 40% 
Skill required 40% 
Additional projects 34% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 29% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 24% 
Hiring party in 
business 9% 
 
Table 8.B – Consistency (%) 
Factor Consistency 
Additional projects 93% 
Right to control 
manner and means 89% 
Label 88% 
Tax treatment 86% 
Employee benefits 85% 
Payment method 85% 
When and how long 
to work 82% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 79% 
Skill required 79% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 68% 
Work location 62% 
Hiring party in 
business 55% 
Relationship duration 54% 
Part of regular 








Right to control 
manner and means 40% 
Label 8% 
Tax treatment 6% 
Employee benefits 5% 
Payment method 5% 
When and how long 
to work 3% 
Additional projects 2% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 2% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 0% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 0% 
Work location 0% 
Relationship duration 0% 
Hiring party in 
business 0% 
Skill required 0% 
 
 




Hiring party in 
business 18% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 3% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 3% 
Skill required 2% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 2% 
Relationship duration 2% 
Work location 1% 
Label 1% 
Payment method 0% 
Additional projects 0% 
Employee benefits 0% 
Tax treatment 0% 
Right to control 
manner and means 0% 
When and how long to 
work 0% 
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ADA Calculations 
 
Table 9.A – Frequency (%) 
Factor Frequency 
Payment method 76% 
Employee benefits 76% 
Right to control 
manner and means 74% 
Tax treatment 71% 
Label 71% 
Work location 59% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 56% 
When and how long to 
work 53% 
Relationship duration 32% 
Skill required 32% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 26% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 21% 
Additional projects 18% 
Hiring party in 
business 6% 
 
Table 9.B – Consistency (%) 
Factor Consistency 
Additional projects 100% 
Payment method 92% 
Label 92% 
Skill required 91% 
Right to control 
manner and means 88% 
Tax treatment 88% 
When and how long to 
work 83% 
Employee benefits 77% 




Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 57% 
Relationship duration 55% 
Work location 50% 








Right to control 
manner and means 44% 
Tax treatment 13% 
Label 13% 
Employee benefits 12% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 11% 
When and how long to 
work 11% 
Relationship duration 0% 
Payment method 0% 
Additional projects 0% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 0% 
Skill required 0% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 0% 
Work location 0% 








Hiring party in 
business 100% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 22% 
Skill required 18% 
Relationship duration 18% 
Part of regular 




Work location 10% 
Right to control 
manner and means 8% 
When and how long to 
work 6% 
Employee benefits 4% 
Tax treatment 4% 
Label 4% 
Additional projects 0% 
Payment method 0% 
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ADEA Calculations 
 
Table 10.A – Frequency (%) 
Factor Frequency 
Right to control 
manner and means 88% 
Payment method 81% 
Employee benefits 77% 
Tax treatment 72% 
Label 70% 
Work location 65% 
When and how long 
to work 63% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 63% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 42% 
Skill required 42% 
Additional projects 40% 
Relationship duration 33% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 30% 
Hiring party in 
business 14% 
 
Table 10.B – Consistency (%) 
Factor Consistency 
Right to control 
manner and means 97% 
Employee benefits 94% 
Tax treatment 94% 
Label 93% 
When and how long to 
work 93% 
Payment method 89% 
Skill required 83% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 83% 
Additional projects 82% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 67% 
Work location 61% 
Relationship duration 43% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 38% 








Right to control 
manner and means 50% 
Part of regular 




When and how long to 
work 7% 
Employee benefits 6% 
Tax treatment 6% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 6% 
Work location 4% 
Payment method 3% 
Label 3% 
Relationship duration 0% 
Additional projects 0% 
Skill required 0% 








Hiring party in 
business 17% 
Relationship duration 14% 
Additional projects 12% 
Source of 
instrumentalities/tools 11% 
Work location 11% 
Part of regular 
business of hiring 
party 8% 
Skill required 6% 
Hiring and paying 
assistants 6% 
When and how long 
to work 4% 
Tax treatment 3% 
Right to control 
manner and means 3% 
Employee benefits 0% 
Label 0% 
Payment method 0% 
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